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INTRODUCTION
An employee working for a nonunion company complains
each payday to the personnel manager that his job requires more
skill than that of other employees being paid the same hourly rate,
and that he therefore should be paid a differential. After hearing
this complaint once too often, the personnel manager discharges
the employee for his "uncooperative attitude." Another nonunion
company gives the same reason for discharging an employee who
complains, in an openly posted letter to management, that she has
been improperly denied a promotion to which she is entitled by
virtue of seniority, traditionally taken into account by the employer
in awarding promotions. Another company suspends an employee
for complaining frequently about dirty washroom facilities or for
refusing to drive a truck in which defective fuses prevent the opera-
tion of the tail-lights. In a unionized company with a collective
bargaining agreement, a black employee asserts to his foreman
and plant manager that he has been consistently assigned menial
work in violation of the nondiscrimination clause of the agreement.
He Presses this claim himself in the belief that the union has not
effectively enough represented black employees in the unit. He
also files a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission against the company and the union. He is promptly dis-
charged and is also stripped of his union membership.
In these cases, the disciplined employee may decide to seek
redress not through a union or a labor contract-there may be
doubts about the union's effectiveness or commitment, or there
may be no union in the plant at all-but rather by filing a charge
with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board). The
charge may allege a violation of section 8(a)(1) of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act): "It shall be an unfair labor
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practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7"; 1 or
of section 8(b)(1)(a): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." 2 Although the
language of section 7 deals primarily with employee rights to aid
or be represented by a labor organization (and that right is not
being restrained in the above instances), it also gives employees
the right "to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 3
The company or union will likely defend on the ground that
the disciplined employee was not engaging in activity that was
"concerted"; nor was the desired end "mutual aid or protection."
Rather, it will be argued that the employee was voicing only a
"personal gripe" solely on his or her own behalf and not as part
of a group protest which is all that is protected by section 7.4 The
employee, on the other hand, will contend that he or she was
complaining about an issue of "wages, hours or working condi-
tions," which-whether or not a part of a larger group complaint-
should be protected under sections 7 and 8 against employer or
union reprisal.
The purpose of this Article is to assess the relative merits of
these two positions. When, if ever, can a complaint, demonstra-
tion, or work stoppage by an individual employee fall within the
shelter of section 7 so that discipline by either the employer.or the
union will constitute an unfair labor practice?
This issue is becoming increasingly significant in today's work-
place. Roughly three-quarters of the workers in America today are
not union members,5 Although many unorganized employees fall
1 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 8(a) (1), 49 Stat. 452 (1935) (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976)).
2Id..§ 158(b) (1)(a).
3 Id. § 157.
41d. Often, this defense will be joined with an assertion that, however the
individual conduct, is characterized for the purposes of § 7, it was nonetheless a
manifestation of "insubordination," "poor attitude," or "lack of cooperation." These
are classic examples of charges which, if sustained, constitute "just cause" for
discipline.
5 See, U.S. BurEAu OF THE CENSUS, STATsTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UN=raD
STATES, 429 table 714 (101st ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as STATisTicAL ABSTRAACT].
This shows that the total number of eniployed persons in the civilian workforce
during 1978 (the last year for which complete data are aiailable) was 102.5
million. Of these, 21.78 million were .union members. Id. 394 table 652.
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outside the coverage of the NLRA,8 it is safe to assume- that at
least half of the workers covered by the NLRA are not represented
by a union.7 Federal and state statutes offer some protection to
these workers when they complain about, or file charges regarding,
specific matters such as race discrimination or safety and health
violations.8 But their only protection against discipline for most
work-related complaints will lie with the National Labor Relations
Board. With the decline in the percentage and numbers of or-
ganized workers in the private sector over the past two decades, the
NLRB appears increasingly to have become a source of protection
against discipline in the absence of collective bargaining agree-
ments and grievance procedures.
Even in cases where there is union representation and a col-
lective bargaining agreement, there appear to be a greater number
of instances in which individuals in the bargaining unit choose to
press by themselves complaints about the workplace, sometimes
because the union has decided not to invoke the contractual griev-
ance procedure and sometimes because the individual is skeptical
regarding the extent of support the union will offer. Perhaps
another reason for the increase in these kinds of cases before the
NLRB is that individual workers are becoming increasingly sensi-
tive to the fact that many working conditions can be directly chal-
lenged as statutory violations, so that complaints about safety and
6 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976). Most notably, public employees and agricul-
tural workers are not covered.
7 Only 23.6 percent of nonagricultural employees were union members in 1976.
See STATISTICAL AusTaAcT, supra note 5, at 429 table 715.
8 For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-261, § 8(c), 86 Stat. 109 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a) (1976)), deals
with discrimination on the basis of race, sex, national origin, and religion, and
provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discrim-
inate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, . . . or
for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or
applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investi-
gation, proceeding, or hearing under this subehapter.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 11,
89 Stat. 1590 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1976)), provides:
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any em-
ployee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or
caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter
or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding or because of
the exercise by such employee on behalf of himself or others of any right
afforded by this chapter.
See also 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1976) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
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health matters or about race and sex discrimination are asserted
not as violations of collective agreements but as violations of public
law for which the worker tends to think of individual redress
through government agencies.
In determining whether such individual complaints fall within
-the protection of section 7, so that employer reprisals will be sharply
limited by federal law, the Board has through a number of fictions
.developed a theory of "constructive concerted activity" as a means
,of accommodating the language of the statute. Although some
courts of appeals have been hospitable to such a theory, most have
squarely rejected it, relying upon the "plain meaning" of section 7.
This Article first traces the NLRB and court decisions and
then attempts to demonstrate that a wider range of protection
for individual complaints about wages, hours, and working condi-
tions would better accord with the fundamental purposes and his-
tory of the National Labor Relations Act and would be fully con-
sistent with Board and court decisions on related questions arising
under the Act.
I. THE LAW OF INDIvIDUAL ACMION
A. "Concerted Activity" or "Personal Gripe"
In order to prove an NLRA violation for discipline of an in-
dividual employee for making a work-related complaint, it must
be demonstrated that the employee was engaged in a "concerted
activity for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection." This
protected purpose is understood to be roughly equivalent to the
goal of affecting "terms and conditions of employment," a phrase
which is found at several vital points in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.9 The "mutual aid or protection" clause was recently
given just such a broad construction by the United States Supreme
Court.10  In all of the not quite hypothetical cases mentioned at
the outset of this Article, and in the decided cases generally, there
is little question that the purpose of the employee's protest is the
improvement of terms or conditions of employment-whether wages,
promotions, health and safety, or race and sex discrimination in
9 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152(9), 158(d), 159(a) (1976).
1 0Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978). The Court held that the phrase
"terms and conditions of employment" embraced union leafleting urging employees
to protest incorporation of -a state "right to work" statute into the state constitution
and a presidential veto of an increase in the federal minimum wage. In the course
of its decision, the Court equated activity for "mutual aid or protection" with
activity "to improve terms and conditions of employment or otherwise improve
[the] lot" of the employees. Id. 564-68.
1981]
290 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
work assignments. If these protests were lodged by two employees,
their action would have been "concerted" and therefore protected
against discipline. Indeed, if two employees agreed to lodge a pro-
test and to designate one of them to speak to management alone,
for himself as well as on behalf of the more timid co-worker, the
spokesman would also be deemed to have engaged in concerted
activity, immune from disciplinary reprisal." Yet when an indi-
vidual employee protests alone, without any consultation with and
authorization by fellow employees, his legal rights under section 7
may be drastically curtailed, even when he purports to voice the
concerns of others but especially when he is speaking only for
himself in lodging a protest regarding working conditions affecting
him alone.
The prevailing principle of law-endorsed both by the courts
of appeals and the NLRB-is that section 7 does not protect "per-
sonal gripes" by individual employees. If an individual complains
to management about working conditions affecting him alone, this
will be treated as individual rather than concerted activity, and
the employee will not be protected against discharge. 12
For example, in Ryder Tank Lines, Inc., 3 an employee was
discharged for appealing to higher management regarding an al-
leged shortage in the pay he received for driving on a particular
trip. The Board found this to be a "purely personal" 14 complaint
and not protected concerted activity. The discharge was therefore
lawful. In Tabernacle Community Hospital & Health Center,",
an employee working in the business department sought to transfer
to the data processing department. The head of the business de-
partment apparently began to harass her, and she wrote a letter
to higher management protesting this treatment. Although there
was no union representing the workers in her department, the
nHitchner Mfg. Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 1253 (1979); Wilson Freight Co., 234
N.L.R.B. 844 (1978) (shop steward), enforcement denied, 604 F.2d 712 (1st Cir.
1979); The Barnsider, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 754 (1972). Cf. Mason & Hanger-Silas
Mason Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 434 (1969) (refusal to hire on account of concerted
activity; applicant was spokesman for himself and another).
12 This rule applies unless employees are protected by other statutes against
employer reprisals. For example, workers who have filed charges of race or sex
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission cannot be
discharged for this reason.
1s 135 N.L.R.B. 936, enforcement denied on otlier grounds, 310 F.2d 233 (5th
Cu-. 1962).
14Id. 938.
15 233 N.L.R.B. 1425 (1977).
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hospital had distributed a detailed employee handbook. The letter
of protest adverted to passages in the handbook providing that job
opportunities would be given to company employees in preference
to applicants from outside of the hospital, and announced the em-
ployee's intention to utilize the grievance procedure outlined in
the employee handbook. For this she was discharged, and the
Board found that no unfair labor practice had been committed
because her complaint was "purely personal." 16 The Board rea-
soned that no other employees were involved in the matter pro-
tested, and that no other employees would have benefited from the
employee's pursuit of her claim.
The Board has also found an unprotected "personal -gripe"
when other employees have actually disclaimed a protest or when
the individual complainant is found to have been motivated by
personal animosity or malice.17  .
. In a number of these "individual protest" cases, particularly
those decided some years ago, the Board or a court has held it
against the employee that there was a collective bargaining agree-
ment in existence affording an orderly grievance procedure for
employee complaints. In R.J. Tower Iron Works,' for example,
an employee-characterized by the Board as argumentative and
troublesome-frequently pressed complaints to his supervisor, for
16 1L 1429.
1
7 The disclaimed-protest issue arose in Del E. Webb Realty & Mgmt Co.,
216 N.L.R.B. 593 (1975). The employer modified the work schedule so that the
employees had to work an additional half hour, but without additional pay. Not
surprisingly, this evoked complaints from the employees. One of them decided to
draft a letter of protest, and got ideas from other employees about the contents of
such a letter. Soon, however, the others decided not to sign or send the letter;
the employee nonetheless decided to write the letter on his own, speaking in the
first person but anonymously. Another employee typed it for him, but said that he
did not want his name mentioned and did not want anything to do with the letter.
When the letter-writer's identity became known to management, he told several
supervisors that he had acted alone and not on behalf of any other employees. He
was discharged, and the Board found no unfair labor practice because the letter was
not a concerted activity.
The case could surely have been decided the other way, given the obvious
pertinence of the complaint (an unpaid additional half-hour of work) to all of the
employees, and their participation in contributing ideas to the individual author.
It is questionable how much weight the Board should have given to the general
disclaimers of participation by other employees, because these may have been
motivated to some degree by fear of reprisal. Such a reprisal would, of. course,
have been unlawful were the letter subscribed to by all of the aggrieved employees.
In cases involving personal animosity or malice toward a supervisor, the Board
has concluded that the employee's protest is merely a personal gripe. See NLRB
v. Lenkurt Electric Co., 459 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1972) (dictum). Cf. Northern
Motor Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L...B. 261 (1961) (discharge valid ,vhen employer
discovered history of employee malice toward prior employer).
18 144 N.L.R.B. 445 (1963).
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which he was discharged. The Board held the discharge to be
lawful because the complaints were "purely personal." 19 The
Board also observed that the existing collective bargaining agree-
ment provided for the submission of written grievances to the fore-
man as a means of invoking the contractual grievance procedure;
by adverting to the fact that the discharged employee had not
attempted to utilize this procedure, the Board was obviously sug-
gesting that there was less statutory protection for organized indi-
vidual grievants than for grievants in nonunion companies. Yet
this suggestion appears contrary to the proviso to section 9(a) of
the NLRA, giving individual employees represented by exclusive
bargaining agents the right to present grievances to the employer
on an individual basis. 20
The Board has also applied the "individual gripe" analysis
to cases in which a union has imposed discipline on a member for
engaging in conduct which arguably is not protected concerted
activity. In Local 5795, Communications Workers of America.*2
an employee found an empty liquor bottle in the plant during the
19 Id 446 n.1.
20 The relevant part of § 9(a) states:
"Provided, t]hat any individual employee or a group of employees shall
have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to
have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining
representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the
terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect..
29 U.S.C. § 159(2) (1976).
The Board continues to mention the fact that a disciplined employee has made
his or her protest without resorting to the grievance procedure as one of several
factors which point toward declaring the conduct unprotected. In Anco Insulations,
Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 81 (1980), a lawfully discharged employee picketed briefly,
protesting his discharge, and turned away workers; when he was later referred to
the same employer for a new job, he was not rehired, because of the picketing
incident. The Board held that his picketing was not concerted activity, and listed
a number of pertinent factors: his picket sign protested only his discharge and not
issues of more common concern such as safety; he undertook the picketing without
the prior support of other employees, without union approval, without use of the
contractual grievance procedure, and without regard to the contractual no-strike
clause, and it did not "inure to the benefit of fellow employees." Id. 4-5. The
Board expressed its concern that any employee thinking he has received unfair
treatment might resort to picketing to disrupt his employer's business, regardless of
the grounds for the discharge. I. 5.
The Anco decision is difficult to square with other decisions in which an
employee is deemed to be engaged in concerted activity when he or she circulates
a letter or petition among fellow workers urging group action, e.g., NLRB v. Empire
Gas Co., 566 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1977), or is merely engaged in a conversation
with another about working conditions, e.g., Datapoint Corp., 246 N.L.R.B. 234
(1979). Moreover, the Board does not clearly state why disregard of the grievance
procedure makes the protest "unconcerted" as opposed to simply unprotected.
21192 N.L.R.B. 556 (1979).
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workday. Apparently in order to avoid discipline for violation of
company rules, the employee reported the true owner of the bottle,
whom the company promptly disciplined. The union imposed a
fine of $500 upon the reporting employee who was also a member
of the union. The Board acknowledged that the fine could coerce
and discourage employees from reporting company rule violations,
but it held that on the facts of the case the fine did not interfere
with a concerted activity. The Board reasoned that the fine did not
inhibit organizing or collective bargaining activities by the em-
ployees, and the employee's "reporting activities were not concerted,
but rather initiated and executed solely by herself." 22 The Board
also found that the union had a legitimate interest in preventing
injury to its members, even when the injury was an apparently
deserved discipline for violation of a company rule against drinking
alcohol on plant premises.23
In short, in most "personal gripe" cases the Board's conclusion
rests upon the coincidence of several facts. The employee's action
is taken completely alone and without advance planning ,or dis-
cussion with other employees, the employee's motive is simply to
advance his or her own personal self-interest, and favorable resolu-
tion of the complaint will not likely improve other employees'
working conditions.
2 4
B. The Board's Theory of "Constructive Concert"
1. Non-union Employees
In cases involving mutual consultations, where a group of
employees designate one of their number as spokesman, the Board
has ruled that the spokesman cannot be discharged for voicing the
group's concerns, even though that person "acts alone" in speaking
to management as But the Board regularly goes further, and treats
as protected "concerted" activity protests by individual employees




24 Regrettably, the Board has not been altogether consistent in applying these
criteria. It has found a "personal gripe" in a number of cases in which the record
would surely have permitted an inference that the complaint was concerted and
protected. See, e.g., Continental Mfg. Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 255 (1965), discussed at
infra note 37 and accompanying text. Most courts have been even less hospitable.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Gibbs Corp., 284 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1960) (refusing to enforce
NLRB order), discussed at infra note 41.
25NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op., Inc., 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir.
1960). See cases cited in supra note 11.
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Thus, even if there is no authorization or designation to
speak on behalf of the group, an individual employee will be pro-
tected against discipline for complaining about any condition of
employment which is "of moment" or a "matter of concern" to
other employees. Frequently, the Board finds that an issue is a
"matter of concern" to the collectivity because the employees ex-
press discontent to one another. Even absent such discussions,
however, the Board has found the complaint to be of "mutual con-
cern" because the disputed working condition is one which in fact
affects other workers. Although the Board commonly states in
these cases that the employee's activity is "concerted" because he
or she is speaking "on behalf of" or "for the benefit of" fellow
employees, this cannot be intended to mean that the employee was
actually designated so to speak but merely that the subject of his
or her complaint is a matter which can affect other employees as
well.
A relatively early case, in which the Board's reinstatement
order was enforced by a court of appeals, shows how a finding of
protected "concerted" activity can be justified on a number of
different theories. In Guernsey-Muskingum Electric Co-operative,
Inc.,26 a group of nonunion employees were unhappy about the
appointment of an inexperienced foreman from outside of the
workforce; their concern was both that he was not selected from
within and that his inexperience would adversely affect their own
work. Thus, their concern related to their working conditions
and promotional opportunities, both clearly "terms or conditions
of employment." Three employees had complained to one another,
and each went to management individually to relay their com-
plaint. Despite the fact that these visits were made without any
coordination, and that none of the three expressly claimed to be a
spokesman for any other employees, the Board found the discharge
of one of the three to be a violation of section 8(a)(1). 27 It mat-
tered not that the discharged employee was not formally desig-
nated as spokesman for other workers.
It is enough if the matter at issue is of moment to the
group of employees complaining and if that matter is
26124 N.L.R.B. 618 (1959), enforced, 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960).
27 The Board also held that the discharge violated § 8(a)(3), but the court of
appeals disagreed because that section requires proof of anti-union animus and there
was no union involved in the case. The court found the Board's reinstatement order
to be unaffected, because it could be sustained, under § 8(a)(1).
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brought to the attention of management by a spokesman,
voluntary or appointed for that purpose, so long as such
person is speaking for the benefit of the interested group.28
The court of appeals enforced the Board's reinstatement order,
but on a narrower theory. It found a "concert of action" because
the court read the record to indicate that the three employees had
actually decided among themselves to take up separately with man-
agement the issue of the unwanted foreman.
Diagnostic Center Hospital Corp.29 makes it clear that the
Board's conclusion that an employee is acting "on behalf of" his
co-workers (and is therefore engaging in protected concerted ac-
tivity) may rest simply on a finding that other employees had pre-
viously spoken critically about the matter among themselves. In
that case, an employee was discharged after writing a letter pro-
testing inadequate salaries, a subject about which employees had
manifested concern. No unfair labor practice was found, because
the Board concluded that the discharge was for cause and not on
account of the letter. The Board, however, did state that the
writing of the letter was a concerted activity, even though the
employee who wrote it was not designated as spokesman by other
employees and did not even tell the other employees that she was
writing it. The Board observed that other employees shared her
concern about the salaries and that she was therefore "acting con-
certedly on behalf of her fellow employees."30  The Board en-
dorsed the view of earlier cases that activity is to be deemed con-
certed if it relates to a matter of common concern.31
In St. Joseph's High School,32 the Board further extended this
reasoning. A lay teacher was discharged for circulating a critical
report about the school shortly before a visit by an accreditation
28 124 N.L.R.B. at 624. The Board left unclear whether "speaking for the
benefit of' meant any more than that the subject was "of moment" to employees
other than the complainant.
29228 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1977).
30 Id. 1216 (dictum).
31 Member Walther took issue with the Board majority. It was not enough, he
stated, in making out a case of concerted activity, that other employees discussed
the matter, and that they shared an interest in the matter, and that they welcomed
the employee's letter. He believed it necessary that the individual's action refer to
or contemplate group action; therefore, he believed that the letter-writing employee
was merely airing a personal gripe.
32 236 N.L.R.B. 1623 (1978), vacated on other grounds, 248 N.L.R.B. 901
(1980).
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team. Although there was no evidence that any other employees
knew of the report or endorsed its circulation, or endorsed the
specific views articulated therein, the Board found the circulation
of the report to be protected concerted activity, and the discharge
to violate section 8(a)(1). The report, which dealt with such mat-
ters as salary scale and labor relations problems, "could only be
interpreted as involving concerns of all of the lay faculty"; the
respondent school was fully aware of the "continuing unsatisfied
concerns" expressed by the employees.-
In several cases, in which the Board determined that the com-
plained-of working condition was "of moment" or "of mutual
concern" to other employees, it looked not only at employee ex-
pressions of concern but also, and indeed principally, at the fact
that the employer's rectifying of the working condition would have
the effect of improving the lot of other employees. In Oklahoma
Allied Telephone Co.,A a group of telephone operators complained
to one another when the air conditioner in the office broke down,
thus making the atmosphere more oppressive, a condition that was
aggravated by paint fumes in the air. When an individual em-
ployee voiced a complaint about these circumstances to manage-
ment, she was summarily discharged. The Board found this un-
lawful, stating that the unhealthy air affected all of the employees.
Thus, the grievance presented by the individual employee "was
inextricably enmeshed with the complaints of other employees and
could not have been adjusted favorably without benefit from such
adjustment flowing to the other employees .... ,5 In other cases
as well, the Board has made clear that the self-interest of the com-
plaining employee is not enough to rob that complaint of its con-
certed nature; it is sufficient that remedying the complaint will in
fact inure to the benefit of other employees. Such is the meaning
which the cases give to the ambiguous standard that the employee
must be acting "on behalf of" fellow workers.
In a recent decision, Dover Garage 1H, Inc.,83 the Board un-
veiled a rationale which, if literally and consistently applied, would
obliterate the distinction between concerted activity and "personal
3s Id. 1623 n.1.
34 210 N.L.R.B. 916 (1974).
35Id. 920.
36 237 N.L.R.B. 1015 (1978), enforcement denied mem., 86 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
I 11,330 (2d Cir. 1979).
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gripes" (although there was no explicit recognition by the Board of
this implication). In Dover Garage, a taxi driver complained to his
dispatcher that another employee had improperly been dispatched
out of turn. Soon-after, the dispatcher warned the employee that he
would be fired if he again interfered with the dispatch system. The
employee filed a charge of violation of section 8(a)(1) on the theory
that the threat of discharge interfered with a protected activity.
The administrative law judge rejected this claim, finding that the
complaint was not concerted. The Board reversed. It concluded
that, although the threat grew out of a particular incident, it was
not necessary to decide whether the employee's protest was con-
certed activity, for the threat would become operative in the event
of any future interference by this employee with the dispatcher,
and such future action might be carried out in a concerted manner.
In a separate concurring opinion, Member Jenkins addressed the
question whether the employee's protest about the dispatching
sequence was indeed concerted activity, and he concluded (con-
trary to the administrative law judge) that it was; it concerned a
working condition which affected many if not all of the employees
(and certainly those employees, other than the complainant, who
were waiting in line for an assignment before the employee who
was actually dispatched).
The Board's decision in Dover Garage clearly demonstrates
the ambiguity and fragility of its standards in these cases. The
administrative law judge characterized the employee's complaint
as a "personal gripe"; one of the Board members characterized it
as a concerted activity; and a Board majority declined to char-
acterize it at all, but concluded that because the employer's present
threat might chill concerted activity in the future, the threat was
unlawful. It need hardly be stated that such a rationale would
make any discipline even for "personal-gripes" unlawful, because the
disciplined employee or others might well be restrained from
presenting such gripes on a concerted basis in the future. The
confusion was compounded further when the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order, for it
did so by an unpublished oral opinion in open court.
In any event, what the Board appears to be holding in its de-
cisions is that a protest, even by a self-interested individual, will be
deemed concerted if it relates to a matter affecting the working
conditions of other employees. There are, however, at least two
difficulties with the Board's formulation. The first is that it has
not been consistently applied. For example, in Continental Manu-
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facturing Co.,37 a discharge of an employee was upheld in spite of
the fact that she was complaining about favoritism by supervisors,
the insulting of employees, and management's locking of employee
washrooms. Certainly these are conditions of "mutual concern."
In a more recent decision, Auto-Truck Federal Credit Union,8
an employee was discharged for making a protest by telephone
about her salary, office tensions, and the discharge of a fellow em-
ployee. The Board adopted the findings and conclusion of the
administrative law judge, who concluded that the complaint about
tensions was not protected concerted activity because it was shared
by only the other discharged individual, who was no longer an
"employee" with whom the complainant could act in "concert."
Nor was the complaint about her wages a concerted activity; al-
though wages are indeed a "matter of moment" for all employees,
the employee had complained only about her own salary. Remark-
ably, however, the Board concluded that the protest of the discharge
37 155 N.L.R.B. 255 (1965). The incident that ultimately resulted in the dis-
charge began when the manager reprimanded employees for the dirty condition of
the washroom. Two employees agreed between themselves to monitor the use of
the washroom by other employees in order to determine blame for the concededly
dirty conditions there. One of those two employees-who was ultimately discharged
for her activity-handed the owner of the company a letter which complained of
the fact that the employees had been insulted and that the washrooms used by many
employees were being kept locked by management; the letter also complained of
favoritism on the part of supervisors and of the need for the supervisors to take a
personnel course in order to improve productivity and employee morale; the letter
also observed that a majority of the employees were disgusted with their treatment
but that they were too frightened to complain. The Board, conceding that the
employee's discharge was in substantial part for writing this letter, found: no unfair
labor practice. It noted that the letter was prepared and signed only by the one
employee, who did not consult with her co-worker or with any other employee
about the grievances in the letter or about sending it. Moreover, the employees
were represented by a union, and the letter-writing employee had not first.consulted
union representatives nor did the union announce support for the sentiments ex-
pressed in the letter. The Board specifically concluded that the letter could not
fairly be treated as the extension of the washroom-monitoring plan between the
letter writer and her co-worker.
The Board's decision is questionable in a number of respects. The union's
failure to endorse the sentiments in a letter ought not disqualify that letter as a
protected activity if it otherwise would be. The lack of protection for protests
vithin the bargaining unit which was accorded by the Supreme Court in Emporium
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975), applied
only to the use of picketing and other economic weapons and not to the presenta-
tion of grievances in letter form. The letter in Continental, moreover, complained
about matters squarely within the range of employee concern, and about matters
(particularly the locked washrooms) which affected all employees and were a source
of concern to them. The letter also could have been linked, had the Board been
so inclined, to the monitoring plan being implemented by the two employees for
the purpose of assuring the sanitary condition, and the full availability, of the wash-
rooms. Finally, the narrow reading of the letter's message seems inconsistent with
a number of other decisions of the Board.
38232 N.L.R.B. 1024 (1977).
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of a former fellow employee (even assuming the discharge to have
been lawful) is concerted activity, because matters relating to dis-
charge are of common concern to all employees. The Board com-
pletely overlooked the inconsistency in the holdings as to wages
and discharge. Indeed, in the same year, the Board upheld the
discharge of an employee who had complained that she was being
harassed by a supervisor for seeking to transfer out of the depart-
ment; in her letter to management, she adverted to a provision in
the company's employee handbook which gave employees priority
in job opportunities to new hires. It was held that the employee's
letter of protest was designed to secure a job opportunity for her-
self only, that it did not relate generally to working conditions of
other employees, and that it did not relate to a matter of "mutual
concern" to her co-workers. 39
Even apart from the elusiveness and inconsistency of the
Board's standards and opinions, its "mutual concern" test may run
into difficulty with the language of section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act. That section protects "concerted activity" which
has as its purpose the "mutual aid and protection" of employees.
Congress apparently contemplated concerted activity as the means
and improvement of working conditions as the purpose. By de-
fining concerted activity as conduct, even by an individual, which
has some general improvement in working conditions as its purpose,
the Board has in effect read out of section 7 the apparent require-
ment that the means be somehow concerted. It has substituted the
independent requirement of concerted benefits for that of concerted
activity, creating a redundancy in the Act. Although the Board's
construction of section 7 may be unexceptionable-and indeed cor-
rect-it would be illuminating if the Board were explicitly to
attempt in its decisions to come to grips with this problem.
2. Unionized Employees
The cases already discussed deal with employee complaints or
grievances that are asserted in a plant in which there is no union
representation and no collective bargaining agreement. When
39 Tabernacle Community Hosp. & Health Center, 233 N.L.R.B. 1425 (1977);
see also Capitol Ornamental Concrete Specialties, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 851 (1980).
In Capitol, the Board found that an employee's complaint about the condition of
the road leading to the company parking lot was not to be deemed concerted: no
other employees complained about or even discussed the matter among themselves,
there was no reason to "infer that his complaint touched a matter of common
concern," and it was therefore no more than a "personal gripe." Id. 851. Another
example of the Board's inconsistencies is Anco Insulations discussed at supra note 19.
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there is a union and a collective bargaining agreement, complaints
by individuals-at least those which plausibly can be referred to
provisions of the agreement-are generally given even greater pro-
tection by the Board, because the Board is more ready to find them
"concerted." The clearest cases for protection are those in which
the person asserting a complaint is a designated union spokesman
and he or she is making reference to a provision of the collective
agreement. 40 Here the employee is speaking in a representative
capacity on behalf of the union and of the employees in the unit
which the union represents, safeguarding not only the interest of a
particular employee but also the interests of the entire bargaining
unit by making certain that the employer does not initiate or con-
tinue a practice which contravenes the labor agreement.41
The same protection has been accorded to a rank-and-file em-
ployee who is discharged for asserting a grievance in the manner
contemplated by the agreement regardless whether the employee
expressly purports to invoke the contract and the grievance pro-
cedure. In NLRB v. Selwyn Shoe Manufacturing Corp.,42 an
employee asserted that she was finished with her work and wanted
more. She refused to follow instructions to "clock out" while a
more junior employee continued to work at a job that the com-
plaining employee was capable of doing. She was fired for this,
and she later returned to the plant with her shop steward. Inter-
estingly, the court was prepared to concede that the employee was
40 Trailmobile Div., Pullman, Inc. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1969);
Clayton Constr. Co., 250 N.L.R.B. 798 (1980), enforced per curiam, 652 F.2d 6
(8th Cir. 1981); see also Hilton Hotels, 248 N.L.R.B. 255 (1980) (union steward
interceded on behalf of co-worker denied a sandwich from employer as was cus-
tomary at end of shift; held, protected concerted activity).
4 1 International Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S.
276 (1975); see also NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975). A
dubious evasion of this policy and application of the "personal gripe" doctrine can
be found in NLRB v. Gibbs Corp., 284 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1960). There, the
court of appeals held that it was lawful for an employer to discharge an employee-
who was also the shop steward-for his "personal gripes" about his own seniority
rights. The employee, as steward, had in the past on a few occasions presented to
the employer grievances about the seniority rights of other employees, and the
Board concluded that it was for this (as well as pressing his own grievances) that
he was discharged. The Board's finding of an unfair labor practice was reversed by
the court, which concluded that the employee had been discharged not for conduct
in his representative capacity but rather for his insistence on his own seniority claims.
This decision (which may in any event have been rendered obsolete by the sub-
sequent Supreme Court decision in Quality Mfg.) needlessly jeopardizes the job
security of union grievance representatives by applying the "personal gripe" standard
in a context in which the grievances of the steward personally and those of the
employees he represents are closely congruent
42 428 F.2d 217 (8th Cir. 1970).
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voicing only a "personal gripe," but it held that this case was dis-
tinguishable from other "gripe" cases because the gripe was ex-
pressed in the manner provided in the grievance procedure of the
labor agreement, which had as its first step the employee's presen-
tation of a grievance to the foreman. The agreement also had a
requirement that seniority be employed in cases of layoff; but it is
clear that the employee did not expressly invoke that provision,
or any part of the contract, just prior to her discharge. The court
held that the company had wrongfully refused to recognize the
employee's right to submit her grievance. "The submission of a
grievance based on the collective bargaining agreement cannot be
the basis for discharge," lest the purposes of the Act-promoting
harmony in labor-management relations and protecting the rights
of the individual to organize for "mutual protection and individual
security"--be thwarted.43 :A concurring judge would have found
the discharge unlawful on the broader theory that the employee,
regardless of conformity to the contractual grievance procedure,
was asserting a substantive right found in a collective bargaining
agreement.
The Board has consistently utilized this broader theory 44 to
hold discharges, unlawful, although-as will be discussed below-
the courts of appeals are sharply divided on the matter. Thus, in
B & M Excavating, Inc.,45 the Board held that the employer vio-
lated section 8(a)(1) by discharging two employees for filing claims
with a state labor commission for overtime pay contended to be
due them under the labor agreement. Even if the employees had
each independently decided to file a claim, without any prior con-
sultation with the other, their action would have been protected as
an implementation of the labor agreement and "an extension of
the concerted activity that gave rise" to it.46
The Board has articulated yet another rationale for treating
as "concerted" the assertion of claims resting on a labor agreement:
such claims "affect the rights of all of the employees in the bar-
gaining unit." In John Sexton & Co.47 an employee whose driver's
43 Id. 221.
44 See Schneider's Dairy Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. No. 1093 (1980) (grievance was
protected concerted activity when employee claimed pay rate was less than that set
by bargaining agreement); E.A. Nord, 250 N.L.R.B. 403 (1980) (employee was en-
gaged in protected concerted activity when he asked what would happen if he filed
a grievance).
45 155 N.L.R.B. 1152 (1965), enforced, 368 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1966).
46 Id. 1154.
47 217 N.L.R.B. 80 (1975).
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license had been suspended refused for that reason to drive for the
company, and was discharged. Because there was a collective
agreement in existence which the Board found arguably to give
the employee the right to refuse to drive for this reason, the Board
found the refusal to be protected concerted activity.48 The Board
reasoned that section 7 protects individual employees' attempts
to implement the agreement, for such attempts necessarily affect the
rights of all employees in the bargaining unit.49 A similar case,
T & T Industries,0 involved refusal to drive a truck because it regu-
larly blew fuses, rendering its lights inoperative. The Board held
that an employee discharged for refusing to drive the truck was
entitled to reinstatement. It reasoned that when the collective
agreement requires the employer to provide safe equipment and
conditions, an employee complaining about and refusing to work
with unsafe equipment acts in the interest of all employees.
In both John Sexton and T & T the Board threw its protective
net broadly, holding that section 7 protection applies even if the
employee's complaint is ultimately found to lack merit. The ra-
tionale for this position is that:
when an employee makes complaints concerning safety mat-
ters which are embodied in a contract, he is acting not only
in his own interest, but is attempting to enforce such con-
tract provisions in the interest of all the employees covered
4 8 The Board also found a violation of section 8(a)(3), prohibiting "discrim-
ination with regard to hire or tenure of employment... to encourage or discourage
union membership." 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). In many of these cases of
discharge for assertion of contract claims, the Board is inconsistent in its resort to
that section. Thus, in B & M Excavating, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 1152 (1965), enforced,
368 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1966), the Board expressly found it unnecessary to review
the conclusion of the administrative law judge that section 8(a)(3) was violated,
because the Board's order could adequately rest on a finding of violation of section
8(a)(1). See also supra note 27. Because "union membership" has traditionally
been given a broad construction so as to include any activity which promotes the
union, see R. GORM.N, LABOR LAw 137-38 (1976), it would probably be in keeping
with that construction to include within the protection of section 8(a) (3) employee
assertions rooted in the labor agreement. As is often pointed out in the cases,
however, the Board can rest a fully effective order on section 8(a)(1) alone.
49 See also Chas. Ind. Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 476 (1973) (employee seeking to
enforce the agreement is affecting the rights of all of the employees in the unit, so
that he necessarily acts not for himself alone but for all of the other workers).
This rationale is very much the same as that adopted by the Supreme Court
in the Quality Mfg. case, discussed at supra note 41. In that case a union steward
asserting a grievance was held to be engaging in protected concerted activity because
this activity safeguards the interest not only of the grievant but also of the entire
bargaining unit by assuring that the employer will not initiate or continue a practice
violative of the collective bargaining agreement.
50 235 N.L.R.B. 517 (1978).
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under that contract. Such activity we have found to be
concerted and protected under the Act .... "I
Yet the Board expanded the Act's protection even beyond
meritless claims in John Sexton and T & T. It held that section 7
protection applies to attempts to implement the bargaining agree-
ment regardless whether the employee refers to the collective bar-
gaining agreement in asserting the claim, and regardless whether
the employee even knows of the agreement. 52 For good measure,
the Board added another and its broadest rationale: discharge for
refusing to drive will restrain other employees (and thus truly con-
certed activity) from future attempts to implement the labor
contract.
Under the Board's theory-widely referred to as that of "con-
structive concerted activity"-it is sufficient, to secure the Act's pro-
tection, that the employee's contract-based protest will "redound to
the group's benefit.... Individual complaints of this sort are simi-
lar to grievances, and since they will have an effect on all employees,
the Board has taken the position that such conduct is protected by
the Act." 13
3. Statutory Claims
Perhaps the most dramatic extension made by the NLRB in
its theory of constructive concerted activity relates to the claims of
individual employees concerning matters of health and safety or
other rights derived from federal or state statutes or administrative
regulations. In Alleluia Cushion Co.,"4 an employee was dis-
51 Roadway Express, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 278, 279 (1975), enforced mem., 532
F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1976).
62Id.; see also Erie Strayer Co., 213 N.L.R.B. 344 (1974) (bald truck tires).
Consistent with its prevailing approach to the individual's assertion of claims under
a labor contract, the Board holds that, in making safety claims or in refusing to
perform allegedly unsafe work, the employee need have only an honest and genuine
belief that the task is unsafe; there may be protected concerted activity even though
the claim lacks merit. Bay-Woods Indus., 249 N.L.R.B. 403 (1980), enforcement
denied, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3175 (6th Cir. 1981).
63 ARO, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 243, 244 (1976), enforcement denied, 596 F.2d 713
(6th Cir. 1979). There is, however, a line of Board decisions, rather difficult to
square with those cited, in which a claim under a collective bargaining agreement is
found to be unprotected or nonconcerted activity because the claim is found by the
Board to be unsupportable on the merits. E.g., Snap-On Tools Corp., 207 N.L.R.B.
238 (1973) (probationary employee was lawfully discharged for complaining about
his failure to get a temporary transfer which was offered instead, to a junior em-
ployee; Board observed that the labor contract gave probationary employees no
seniority, that the complaining employee had rested his claim not upon the labor
contract but upon his personal observation of past practices, and that his complaint
was thus purely personal and not "concerted").
94221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).
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'charged principally because he made complaints to the California
Occupational Safety and Health Agency concerning plant violations
of state safety regulations. The administrative law judge found
the discharge to be lawful, because it was not for a concerted activity
protected by section 7 of the NLRA. There was no collective bar-
gaining agreement in effect; the discharged employee was not joined
in his complaint by other employees; he did not consult with other
employees, and no employees later approved of his actions; and he
therefore acted (concluded the judge) purely from his own indi-
vidual concerns about safety. The NLRB reversed the administra-
tive law judge and found a violation of section 8(a)(1).
The Board stated that it was obligated to construe the NLRA
in a manner recognizing the policies of other employment legisla-
tion, such as that dealing with occupational safety and health. It
refused to assume 'that other employees did not endorse the com-
plaints to California OSHA, and held that filing a complaint with
the state safety agency was in furtherance of all employees' rights
under the state statute. The Board thus announced a broad pre-
sumption that health or safety complaints are endorsed by all em-
ployees, and that their filing is therefore concerted activity. The
filing of a complaint with the state safety agency was deemed by the
Board to be in furtherance of the rights of the respondent's
employees under the California act. Because safe and healthful
conditions
have been legislatively declared to be in the overall public
interest, the consent and concert of action emanates from
the mere assertion of such statutory rights. . . . In the
absence of any evidence that fellow employees disavow
such representation, we will find an implied consent thereto
and deem such activity to be concerted.35
The Board has subsequently applied these principles to other
instances of formal employee complaints or charges filed with gov-
ernmental agencies enforcing safety legislation." The Alleluia
M Id. 1000.
56 E.g., Bighorn Beverage, 236 N.L.R.B. 736 (1978), enforced as modified, 614
F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1980). There, the employee acted alone in complaining to
the state Department of Health and Environmental Sciences about carbon monixide
fumes at his workplace; the Board found concerted activity, because there was "a
safety problem of common concern to all persons who were then working at the
Respondent's facility." 236 N.L.R.B. at 752. The court of appeals denied enforce-
:ment, emphasizing the absence of a collective bargaining agreement which it thought
to be essential to application of the "constructive concerted activity" doctrine, assum-
iug that doctrine to be valid at alL
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Cushion precedent also was applied in a case in which the employee
complained not to a state agency but directly to the employer. In
Akron General Medical Center,57 the employee was disciplined for
complaining to the employer about the excess of lint and dust in
the hospital laundry. In finding an unfair labor practice, the Board
observed that the employee's complaint sought compliance with
"standards concerning occupational safety." 58 The Board has also
clearly stated that, in the absence of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, an individual complaint about unsafe working conditions is
protected concerted activity even when it takes the form of a re-
fusal to perform the work in question. In Pink Moody, Inc.,59 an
employee was laid off and not recalled because he had complained
about the defective brakes on the employer's truck and had refused
to drive the truck.' The Board concluded that employee compliance
with the employer's order to drive the unsafe truck would have vio-
lated safety regulations, and therefore that the employee's refusal
"would inure to the benefit of all of the [employer's] drivers." 6o
Because the employee's protest was, under the analysis of Alleluia
Cushion, a matter of "vital concern" to all of the employees, his
refusal to drive was to be deemed concerted in the absence of dis-
avowal by other employees.
Two different themes can be heard in the Board's decision
in Alleluia Cushion. One is simply the familiar refrain in the
Board's decisions of many years:. a complaint by an individual em-
ployee will be deemed concerted-even though he is in fact acting
alone-if the issue he raises is "of moment to" or is "of mutual
concern to" other employees in the plant. The other theme is
more specific and more innovative: a complaint by an individual
employee which finds its source in public labor legislation or regu-
lations is presumed to be of mutual concern to all employees, and
that presumption can be overcome only by proof of general em-
ployee disavowal. The Board, very soon after Alleluia Cushion
was decided, made it clear that that decision did not rest alone on
the latter rationale but rather more broadly on the "mutual con-
cern" rationale.
57232 N.L.R.B. 920 (1977).
58 Id. 927. Despite this conclusion, it is unclear whether there were any formal
governmental standards which obtained, and apparently the employee 'never ad-
verted specifically to any such standards in registering his complaint with the
employer.
59 237 N.L.R.B. 39 (1978).
8 d. 40.
1981]
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. In Air Surrey Corp.,61 paychecks issued by the employer had in
the past been dishonored; three employees drove to the employer's
bank, and one went in to inquire whether the employer had suf-
ficient funds to meet its next payroll. Upon learning of this
incident, the employer discharged the inquisitive employee. The
Board, expressly disclaiming any reliance upon the fact that the
inquiry at the bank was part of a group visit there, held that the
employee's individual inquiry was protected concerted activity.
Alleluia Cushion, which was regarded as the controlling precedent,
was said to rest not only on the policy of advancing the purposes
of federal and state safety laws, "but also on the premise that an
individual's actions may be considered to be concerted in nature
if they relate to conditions of employment that are matters of
mutual concern to all the affected employees." 62 The Board con-
cluded that collecting pay for one's work is on a par with safe
working conditions as a vital employee concern. Although the
inquiring employee was not acting from entirely altruistic motives,
his actions "clearly encompassed the well being of his fellow em-
ployees" and there was a "likelihood that the other employees,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, shared his interest in
receiving a valid paycheck and supported his effort to secure Re-
spbndent's compliance" with its financial obligation. 3 Not con-
tent, however, to rest on this broader rationale, the Board also
observed that as in Alleluia Cushion the employee's individual
action was designed to forestall employer violation of state law-
that is, the Ohio law which makes it a misdemeanor to issue a check
knowing that it will be dishonored. In dissent, Member Walther
read Alleluia Cushion to rest narrowly on a Board policy of foster-
ing the aims of federal safety and health legislation, and he would
61229 N.L.R.B. 1064 (1977), enforcement denied, 601 F.2d 256 (6th Cir.
1979) (enforcement denied because the employer had no knowledge that the dis-
charged employee was acting other than in an individual capacity).
62 229 N.L.R.B. at 1064.
03 Id.; see also G.V.R., Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 147 (1973), in which the employer
had unlawfully required two employees to give him kickbacks from their wages on
a hospital construction job for the United States Army, and then discharged them
for giving interviews to an Army labor compliance inspector regarding payroll ir-
regularities and to a Labor Department investigator regarding the employer's non-
compliance with the Davis-Bacon Act. Giving interviews was held to be protected
concerted activity because the interviews were for the protection of all similarly
situated company employees. Chairman Miller dissented, arguing that an individual
making a complaint to another governmental agency regarding noncompliance with
another labor statute should not per se be protected under § 7 of the NLRA. This
case was decided before Alleluia Cushion.
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have held that the discharge of the inquiring employee was lawful,
principally because the employer was unaware at the time of the
discharge that two other employees were part of the plan to make
inquiry at the bank. 4
In spite of the de-emphasis in Air Surrey of that part of Alleluia
Cushion which developed the importance of specific health and
safety legislation, the Board in the few years since Alleluia Cushion
was decided has placed very great weight indeed upon that part,
and has expanded it quite beyond its initial boundaries. In a
setting not unlike that in Air Surrey, the Board in Ambulance
Services of New Bedford 6 held that it was unlawful to discharge
an individual employee for filing a criminal complaint against the
company president on account of payroll checks returned for in-
sufficient funds. The Board noted that there were earlier protests
on the subject by many employees as well as by the union, so that
the criminal complaint was "part and parcel" of this group action.
But the Board also emphasized that the discharged employee was
disciplined for resorting to a state-provided public procedure which
could reasonably be expected to aid all of his fellow employees.
In Self Cycle & Marine Distributor Co.,6 6 it was held unlawful for
an employer to discharge an employee in part for pursuing a claim
for unemployment compensation covering a period of layoff some
months before. The Board reiterated its position in Alleluia
Cushion that it was obliged to accommodate its decisions to the
larger scheme of labor legislation as a whole. Because unemploy-
ment compensation benefits arise from the employment relationship
and are an aspect of national labor policy, and because the em-
ployee's compensation claim was a matter of common interest to
other employees who might find themselves in a similar position
in the future, the Board held that the employee's assertion of his
claim demonstrated to other employees that access to state unem-
ployment compensation procedures could not lawfully be denied
by the employer. The Board accorded section 7 protection, for
similar reasons, to an individual employee who filed a workmen's
compensation claim following a work-related illness, 67 and to an
64The approach suggested by Member Walther was later adopted by the court
of appeals in denying enforcement of the Board's order. See supra note 61.
65229 N.L.R.B. 106, enforced mem., 564 F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1977).
66 237 N.L.R.B. 75 (1978).
67 Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp., 245 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1979), enforcement
denied, 635 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1980).
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individual employee who filed a sex-discrimination complaint with
a state Fair Employment Practices Commission.68
The Board has gone even further and has concluded that the
refusal of an individual employee to perform work, not because it
is dangerous but because it is not properly compensated by virtue
of title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, is protected concerted
activity. In Dawson Cabinet Co.,69 a female employee was dis-
charged for refusing a job assignment when her reason for doing
so was that men performing the same work were paid more than
women. The Board held that, even though the employee acted
alone, her protest about sex discrimination, and her refusal to work
in pursuit of that protest, were protected concerted activity. The
Board held that her attempt to vindicate the rights of women em-
ployees under title VII was as a matter of law concerted activity.
This was not simply an individual concerned with her own pay;
it was an individual protesting the employer's noncompliance with
a federal statute and was therefore concerted activity for the pro-
tection of employees similarly situated.70
The Board has also applied the Alleluia Cushion principle
to find a union's discipline of an employee to violate section 8(b)
(1)(A). In General Teamsters Local 528 (Theatre Service Co.),71
a black employee asked his union to get him onto the company's
seniority list. After concluding that the union was not effectively
asserting his seniority claim, the employee filed a charge against
the union with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). Some months later, the employee was elected to serve
as the union's alternate steward; a squabble within the member-
ship -induced both- the steward and the employee to resign their
positions, but not long after they both sought reinstatement. Union
officials reinstated the steward, but not the alternate steward, stating
that the reason was his having filed a charge against the union with
the EEOC. The employee then filed a charge against the union
with the NLRB, claiming that the withholding of reinstatement
68 Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 252 N.L.R.B. 1124 (1980) (union found to
discriminate in making assignments of work, in its capacity as employer of business
agent).-
69 228 N.L.R.B. 290, enforcement denied, 566 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1977).
70 The Board's order was, however, denied enforcement on appeal, the court
holding that the doctrine of "constructive concerted activity" was unsound and that
it was in any event inapplicable for lack of a controlling collective bargaining agree-
ment. 566 F.2d at 1083-84.
71237 N.L.R.B. 258 (1978); see also Hotel & Restaurant- Employees, 252.
N.L.R.B. 1124 (1980).
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to his position as alternate steward violated section -8(b) (1)(A).
The Board agreed, and took the rather unusual step of ordering re-
instatement as alternate steward. The Board, citing Alleluia
Cushion, Air Surrey, and Dawson Cabinet, reiterated that the pol-
icies of title VII must be accorded the same primacy in the en-
forcement of the NLRA as the policies of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act. The Board conceded that the charging employee
acted alone in filing his charge against the union and that in doing
so he was concerned only about his own seniority status. None-
theless, the Board held that the charge presented to the EEOC
must be treated as having been made in the common interest of
all of the employees, and that it was therefore protected concerted
activity.
By way of summary, one might say that the doctrine of "con-
structive concerted activity" as developed by the National Labor
Relations Board rests (as do most "constructive" facts) upon an
accumulation of fictions and fabricated presumptions. An indi-
vidual complaint is said to have been made "on behalf of" a group
of workers not because the complainant has been delegated to speak
but rather because rectification of his grievance will inure to the
benefit of others. Others will also benefit whenever an individual
asserts a claim which can plausibly (even if after the fact) be linked
to a collective bargaining agreement. Even in the absence of such
an agreement, group benefit is presumed to flow from claims con-
cerning safety and health, or from claims which find their source
in any statute or public regulations. Through the accumulation of
these fictions and presumptions, the Board has accorded "protected
concerted" status to the great majority of individual complaints
(sometimes accompanied by a refusal to work) about conditions in
the workplace. Yet the Board continues to cling to the notion that
certain such complaints are merely "personal gripes," and continues
to place specific factual situations into that category with little
apparent consistency, a most unfortunate failing given the fact that
fundamental rights of employers and employees are in the balance.
It is the major thesis of this Article that all work-related claims
of individual employees should be treated as within the scope of the
term "concerted activities" in section 7 of the NLRA. The Board's
doctrine of "constructive concerted activity" represents a fitful grop-
ing towards precisely this reading of section 7. Whatever criticism
the Board might merit for utilizing fictions to achieve results that
are for the most part sound, far greater criticism is warranted for
the courts of appeals, which have either endorsed the doctrine of
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"constructive concerted activity" in a begrudging and niggardly
manner or have rejected it outright.
C. The Judicial Reaction
The doctrine of "constructive concerted activity" has provoked
some division and confusion within the courts of appeals, but the
tide-which has gathered momentum in only the last two years-
runs strongly against the approval of that doctrine. Two cir-
cuits-the Second and the Seventh-have explicitly endorsed the
view that the individual assertion of claims under a collective bar-
gaining agreement is to be treated as concerted activity. But even
those two courts have made it clear that in any other context, ac-
tivity will not be deemed concerted unless it is part of or a prelude
to some form of group protest. Seven other courts of appeals,
clearly adhering to the latter approach, have either avoided dealing
with or have disparaged the view that claims under labor contracts
are necessarily to be treated as concerted. No court of appeals has
endorsed the proposition that individual complaints, protests, or
refusals to work become concerted activity merely because they will
inure to the benefit of other employees or because they invoke
statutory procedures for the protection of public rights. Indeed,
judicial reversals of the NLRB have reflected not only disagree-
ment with the Board's articulated legal theory of constructive con-
certed activity, but also all too frequently a reading of the factual
record in so inhospitable a manner as to find only individual protest
when a reasonable factfinder could readily have found actual group
conduct.3
The appellate case most frequently cited to support the doc-
trine of "constructive concerted activity" is a Second Circuit deci-
sion, NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc.73 In that case, an em-
ployee was discharged, and the Board concluded that the reason was
his frequent complaints to management and the union about such
matters as work assignments and his entitlement to overtime and
expense money. The court of appeals enforced the Board's rein-
statement order, concluding that the Board was free to reject the
trial examiner's inference that the employee was simply seeking to
harass his employer into granting him more money. The court
explained:
Even if it were true that John was acting for his personal
benefit, it is doubtful that a selfish motive negates the pro-
72 See infra text following note 89.
73 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
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tection that the Act normally gives to Section 7 rights....
Contrary to the examiner's statements that John was act-
ing alone despite an almost complete lack of interest by his
fellow employees, the testimony of William Landers, Col-
lins, Soebke, and Kleinhans shows that on several occasions
John was speaking for William and Collins as well as for
himself. Furthermore, while interest on the part of fel-
low employees would indicate a concerted purpose, ac-
tivities involving attempts to enforce the provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement may be deemed to be for
concerted purposes even in the absence of such interest
by fellow employees.74
This latter, conclusory statement was buttressed by no further rea-
soning or citation of precedent.
The Interboro case was cited and endorsed by the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp.,75 in
which an employee-whose paycheck reflected only a $27 pay in-
crease for the month instead of a $75 increase promised by the
employer-asked a union officer and a co-worker whether there had
been a "payoff" (presumably from the employer to the union). The
employee later reiterated this accusation to company representa-
tives. The court agreed with the Board that this was protected
concerted activity, even in the absence of any interest by fellow
employees, as an attempt to enforce the collective bargaining
agreement.7
6
The Fourth Circuit appeared to endorse Interboro in its
memorandum decision in Roadway Express, Inc. v. NLRB.7" The
court enforced a Board order in a case in which the Board had held
that "when an employee makes complaints concerning safety matters
which are embodied in a contract, he is acting not only in his own
interest, but is attempting to enforce such contract provisions in
the interest of all the employees covered under that contract." 78
74 Id. 499-500.
75452 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
76 The court distinguished an earlier case in which an employee's protest (in
the absence of a union and a collective bargaining agreement) about a meager pay
increase was held to be unprotected, Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273
(7th Cir. 1967), as involving a "malicious" venting of a personal grievance. 452
F.2d at 207.
77 532 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1976).
78217 N.L.R.B. 278, 279 (1975), enforced mem., 532 F.2d 751 (4th Cir.
1976). Because the court's order was issued without any published reasons, it is
difficult to assert that the disposition constituted a considered endorsement of the
Interboro approach. This is confirmed by the fact that within four years, the
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Only two appellate decisions reflect any development of the
rationale for the doctrine of constructive concerted activity as ap-
plied in cases of individual claims under collective bargaining
agreements (often referred to in court opinions as "the Interboro
doctrine"). One court, enforcing a Board order under section
8(a)(1), purposefully chose to decide the case on grounds other than
the Interboro doctrine, but nonetheless articulated a basis for its
decision which is widely believed to underlie Interboro as well.
In NLRB v. Selwyn Shoe Manufacturing Corp.,79 an employee
was discharged for refusing to "clock out" for the day so long as
there was a junior employee doing work that she (the complaining
employee) was capable of performing; she made known her reasons
in a conversation with her foreman. The court agreed that the
discharge was for engaging in a protected concerted activity. Al-
though one judge would have applied the rule of Interboro-
that asserting a right found in a collective agreement is per se con-
certed activity-the court majority instead viewed the discharge
as having been triggered by the employee's presenting a formal
grievance in the precise manner contemplated by the labor agree-
ment (i.e., a communication from the employee to her foreman).
The court held that the presentation of a grievance cannot lawfully
be a basis for discharge, but its rationale was sufficiently broad to
sustain even the Interboro rule; it stated that rights under a col-
lective agreement, although personally asserted by individual em-
ployees, are protected under section 7 "because the collective
bargaining agreement is the result of concerted activities by the
employees for their mutual aid and protection." 8o The theory
that the employee's complaint constitutes something of a revival of
Fourth Circuit rendered a major decision, explicitly disavowing reliance on Interboro,
extensively quoting from flatly contrary judicial authority, and never mentioning its
decision in Roadway Express. Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d
304 (4th Cir. 1980).
Indeed, Interboro has fallen on hard times even in the circuit whence it
came. The Second Circuit recently referred to Interboro's endorsement of the prin-
ciple of constructive concerted activity as dictum. Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB,
637 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1980); accord NLRB v. Adams Delivery Serv., 623
F.2d 96, 100 n.1 (9th Cir. 1980). That is even less charitable treatment than the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit accorded Interboro, char-
acterizing the constructive concerted activity principle as an alternative holding.
Kohls v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 173, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1390
(1981). See infta text accompanying notes 115-20.
79428 F.2d 217 (8th Cir. 1970). Subsequently, this court once again care-
fully avoided endorsing Interboro. NLRB v. Dawson Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d 1079
(8th Cir. 1977). Indeed, Dawson and a later case all but explicitly rejected it.
Koch Supplies, Inc. v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
80 428 F.2d at 221.
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the concerted activity leading to the negotiation of ihe labor con-
tract has been endorsed by the NLRB, and has been articulated,
albeit with skepticism, by other courts of appeals.
81
The one judicial declaration that comes close to supplying a
thorough and satisfying rationale for the doctrine of constructive
concerted activity appears in a dissenting opinion by Judge Lay
of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. In Illinois Ruan
Transport Corp. v. NLRB,8 2 a truckdriver was discharged after
reporting certain safety deficiencies to his employer and seeking
an inspection of the company's vehicles by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission. The Board found this conduct to be protected
concerted activity, in furtherance of all employees' rights under the
collective bargaining agreement. The court of appeals, however,
refused to enforce the Board's order, because it concluded from its
reading of the record that the discharge must have been for other
and work-related reasons.83
In dissent, Judge Lay focused upon the public policies under-
lying section 7. He argued that section 7 was intended to protect
not the union's interest but the employees' interest, and that em-
ployees are specifically given the right by section 9(a) of the NLRA
to assert and process their own complaints and grievances indi-
vidually (provided the outcome is consistent with the collective
agreement). Judge Lay believed it "too superficial a guideline"
to deny protection to this employee's activities "merely because he
did not have an assistant in his truck" 8 at the time. He urged
that "concerted activity" could be defined only in the context of
its neighboring and interrelated phrase "mutual aid or protection."
Although Judge Lay did not read the Act to protect an individual
protest which perhaps is vented by reason of personal animosity
or is unrelated to group interest or concern, he felt that:
it is a reasonable and necessary construction of the Act
that "concerted activity" may exist if there is some reason-
able relationship connecting an employee's conduct with
the "mutual aid and protection" of other employees and
such activity is based upon rights collectively recognized
within a bargaining agreement.8
81 E.g., Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635- F.2d at 308; Kohs v.
NLRB, 629 F.2d at 176-77.
82404 F.2d 274, 281 (8th Cir. 1968).
83 Id. 277-80.
84 Id. 288 (Lay, J., dissenting).
S5 Id. 288-89.
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Thus, in Judge Lay's view, the individual's protest, regardless
of his motive, is protected if it has the intended effect of improv-
ing working conditions in a manner which benefits other employees,
and that will always be the case when the protest is consistent with
the labor agreement.
[W]here [the employee] is asserting a right consistent with
the collective contract, both §§ 9(a) and 7 give him a right
to proceed alone. Congress obviously intended through
§ 9 and § 7 to recognize that an individual employee's
rights are not totally submerged by the group when asser-
tion of those rights is otherwise consistent with the inter-
est of the group. To reason otherwise is to deny the very
purpose for which the union exists; that is, the protec-
tion of the rights of the individual employee.""
In an aside, Judge Lay suggested that the protection of "con-
certed activities" in section 7 was not intended to constrict the
rights of individuals but was rather to overturn "the early common-
law anomaly which permitted individual conduct, but proscribed
the same activity by two or more persons acting collectively" 87
on a theory of criminal and civil conspiracy. He quoted from a
1796 English case, in which the court had said: "As in the case of
journeymen conspiring to raise their wages; each may insist on
raising his wages if he can; but if several meet for the same purpose,
it is illegal, and the parties may be indicted for a conspiracy." Il
Congress's principal purpose in section 7 of the Wagner Act was
simply to make it clear that group action to improve working con-
ditions was to rest on no weaker legal foundation than individual
action undertaken with the same purpose.
All other judicial decisions that deal with the Board's doc-
trine of constructive concerted activity either totally reject it or
else limit it to situations in which the complaining individual
relies upon a collective bargaining agreement. The courts which
do go as far as half-heartedly endorsing Interboro-or more ac-
curately leaving Interboro untouched-take pains to show that the
case before them is not governed by that decision because, for ex-
ample, no collective bargaining agreement is in effect; their "ap-
proval" of Interboro is thus dictum, and is usually accompanied
SO Id. 289 (footnote omitted).
87 Id. 289 n.6.
88 Id. 289 n.6 (quoting Rex v. Mawbey, 6 T.R. 619, 636 (1796)).
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by sharp criticism. In short, Interboro and its "constructive con-
cert" doctrine have no other real champions in the court of appeals.
These judicial decisions rejecting the doctrine of constructive
concerted activity have focused upon something akin to a dictionary
definition of the word "concerted," and have been unilluminated
by any analysis of the history and purposes of the National Labor
Relations Act. These decisions have rejected the Board's attempt
to link, by one or more fictions, individual protests to group ac-
tivity. They have instead concluded that statutory protection is
dependent upon proof of at least incipient group action, as distin-
guished from mere group benefit. The courts have looked not
merely for concerted effect but also for concerted purpose and con-
certed conduct.
Perhaps the most well known and frequently cited decisions
manifesting this approach come from the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit. Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB, 9 which
was decided prior to Interboro, presented a factual record which
readily could have justified a conclusion that there was concerted
activity in fact without requiring resort to any theory of "construc-
tive" concerted activity rooted in an employee's attempt to enforce
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. But the court
chose to read the requirement of "concerted" activity very narrowly,
and reversed the Board's finding of a section 8(a)(1) violation.
Like the Board, the court was prepared to assume that the dis-
charged employee was ordered by management to be assigned no
further work on account of his stated intention to report the com-
pany for violations of Interstate Commerce Commission regulations
and because he counseled drivers about their entitlement under the
collective agreement to such benefits as holiday pay, vacations, and
trip assignments. The court also accepted the Board's factual con-
clusion that the employee's purpose was not to advance his personal
interest but was instead directly related to the interests of all of the
employees in their working conditions.
At that point, however, the court and the Board parted, as the
court found no evidence that the discussions of contract rights in-
volved any effort "to initiate or promote any concerted action to do
anything" 90 about the various complaints and grievances discussed.
It is not questioned that a conversation may constitute a
concerted activity although it involves only a speaker and
89330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964).
90 Id. 684-85.
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a listener, but to qualify as such, it must appear at the
very least that it was engaged in with the object of initi-
ating or inducing or preparing for group action or that it
had some relation to group action in the interest of the
employees.... Activity which consists of mere talk must,
in order to be protected, be talk looking toward group ac-
tion. If its only purpose is to advise an individual as to
what he could or should do without involving fellow
workers or union representation to protect or improve his
own status or working position, it is an individual, not a
concerted, activity, and, if it looks forward to no action
at all, it is more than likely to be mere "griping." 91
The court suggested, in dictum, that there would have been
protected activity had the employee actually prosecuted a grievance
of his own. It failed, however, to explain why this would have
been "concerted" activity, or why counseling other employees with
a possible view toward their filing a grievance was any less deserv-
ing of statutory protection.92
Despite that Mushroom Transportation dictum, an employee
who did register a complaint with management was treated no bet-
ter by the same court in NLPLB v. Northern Metal Co.,93 decided
after the Interboro case in the Second Circuit. A probationary
employee received his paycheck for his third week of employment,
but was not paid for the Labor Day holiday which fell within the
pay period. The employee raised this issue with the company's chief
executive officer, and was informed that although the collective
bargaining agreement provided for pay for Labor Day, it was long-
standing company practice that probationary employees received no
holiday pay. When the employee raised the claim with union offi-
cials, he was informed that the union would not take up the matter
because he was not a union member.
Because disputes of probationary employees were excluded from
the contractual grievance procedure, the employee pressed his com-
91 Id. 685. The court found irrelevant the fact that many of the discussions
were initiated by other employees, who knew that the soon-to-be terminated em-
ployee had been a shop steward in a previous job; this fact "would carry no implica-
tion that there was any general or concerted move on foot or sought." Id.
92 Presumably, the court would have been prepared to find "concerted" the
explanation of contract rights when done by a formally designated union repre-
sentative. Indeed, it is quite likely that this conclusion would now be compelled
by the analysis of the Supreme Court in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S.
251 (1975). One must wonder why a self-appointed but knowledgeable employee
advisor is entitled to any less protection against discipline by the employer.
9s 440 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1971).
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plaint to the company president a second time. The president,
evidently displeased that the employee had been given a copy of the
collective bargaining agreement, discharged him as an "undesirable
employee." 94 The Board, concluding that there is concerted ac-
tivity in pressing a contract grievance which affects the rights of
other employees in the unit, found the discharge unlawful. 95
The court repudiated this analysis, and with it that of the
Interboro case. The Interboro doctrine, said the court, was based
on "a legal fiction, constructive concerted activity, in an effort to
support a judicial conception of a sound interpretation of the
Act." 96 The court observed that the words of the statute were
unambiguous: "The Act surely does not mention 'concerted pur-
poses.' "97 The court consulted Webster's New International Dic-
tionary for the meaning of "concert" and "concerted," which it
found to be "mutually contrived or planned." It concluded that
the protection afforded by Mushroom Transportation to "talk look-
ing toward group action" was the "most expansive view" adopted
in the circuit, but that this "stretching" of the normal meaning of
the statutory language would be endorsed "in order to facilitate
the policies of the Act." 98 Because the employee's claims in North-
ern Metal regarding his contractual rights to holiday pay did not
look toward group action for its enforcement, his discharge was held
to be lawful.
Judge Biggs filed a dissenting opinion 99 in which he argued
that the efforts of an individual employee to enforce a collective
bargaining agreement should be considered concerted activity per
se. He invoked the Selwyn Shoe decision in the Eighth Circuit,100
and the dissenting opinion in that circuit of Judge Lay in Illinois
Ruan,101 arguing that attempts to enforce provisions under col-
lective agreements constitute the assertion of a "collective" right
because success will redound to the direct benefit of all employees
similarly situated (there, all other probationary employees, both
present and future). Judge Biggs stated that his analysis would
pose no threat to the contractual grievance procedure, because em-
ployees would normally request union assistance in prosecuting a
94 id. 883.
Or 175 N.L.R.B. 896 (1969), enforcement denied, 440 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1971).
96 440 F.2d at 884.
97Id. (emphasis in original).
98 Id.
99 Id. 887 (Biggs, J., dissenting).
10o See supra text accompanying notes 79-89.
1o See supra text accompanying note 82.
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grievance, and because in any event Congress has, in section 9(a) of
the NLRB, "put its imprimatur on individual processing of griev-
ances." 102
Three other circuit courts have declined to follow the lead of
Interboro in cases involving individual claims within the context
of a labor conrtact. Although in each case the court purported to
distinguish Interboro, the reasoning and outcome were so in con-
flict with the Interboro approach as to make clear the court's re-
jection of that precedent.
In NLRB v. C & I Air Conditioning, Inc.,10 3 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit faced a situation tailor-made for the
102 440 F.2d at 888. In a case decided between Mushroom Transportation and
Northern Metal, the Third Circuit sustained a Board finding that two employees had
been unlawfully discharged for protesting the company's one-year suspension of
profit-sharing payments. The plant was apparently not unionized. The employees,
along with other dissatisfied employees, voiced their concerns and their suggestions
at an employee meeting called by management, as well as to their foreman before
and after the meeting. Their individual vocalization of dissatisfaction on behalf of
all employees was deemed by the court to be sufficient "group action" within
Mushroom Transportation. There was sufficient concerted activity when the two
discharged employees were part of a group which had a gripe and assembled to
present it to management It was irrelevant that the group failed formally to select
a spokesman. Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345 (3d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935 (1970). In a dissenting opinion in which he invoked
Mushroom Transportation to reach a very different conclusion from that of the
court, Judge Kalodner stated: "These expressions were nothing more than 'griping'
and could not by any stretch of the imagination .be said to attain the dimension of
an intention or attempt to initiate or promote concerted action by their fellow
employees." Id. 1357.
Before taking leave of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which has
been perhaps the most vigorous opponent of the doctrine of constructive concerted
activity, it is appropriate to recount the startling development represented by Reading
Hosp. & Med. Center, 226 N.L.R.B. 611 (1976), enforced mer., 562 F.2d 42 (3d
Cir. 1977). There, an employee who served as an operating room technician, upon
learning of the hospital's proposed termination of its surgical residency program,
mentioned to other employees her intention to write a letter to a newspaper because
"such a letter might help." Id. 612. She did not elaborate on this statement; nor
did she tell any other employee at any time what she planned to include in the
letter. The hospital first suspended her, then discharged her, in part for her threat
to write the letter. In the face of the employer's argument that her threat to send
the letter was not concerted activity, the administrative law judge found the
opposite to be true, simply stating-without reasons or citation of precedent-that
her conduct "fell within the Act's protection." Id. 614. The Board, in a short-form
opinion, adopted the findings and conclusions of the administrative law judge.
Without explanation-and inexplicably-the Third Circuit enforced the Board's re-
instatement order. Here was an individual employee, making an unelaborated
threat on a single occasion, to write an individual letter to a newspaper, about a
subject which-for all that is shown in the report of the administrative law judge-
did not threaten the working conditions of the employee in question or indeed of any
other persons deemed "employees" within the coverage of the NLRA. No
group action was taken, planned, or even mentioned. No collective bargaining
agreement existed. The disposition of this case in the Third Circuit goes con-
siderably further than any judicial opinion has yet gone in protecting (albeit without
any discussion whatever) individual employee complaints as "concerted activity."
103 486 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1973).
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Board's "constructive concerted activity" theory: a combination
of a labor contract and an individual complaint about safety. The
Board found that the employee engaged in protected concerted
activity, for which he was discharged, when he complained to the
general contractor that a temporary stairway on which he had to
climb with heavy air conditioning equipment was hazardous.
10 4
The court overturned the Board's decision, holding that for an
employee complaint to constitute concerted activity the employee
must be acting with other employees or actually on their behalf;
in this case, the employee was acting alone and on his own behalf.1 5
The court declined to endorse the Interboro doctrine. But it
held that Interboro would be inapplicable under the facts of this
case because the complaining employee did not make express
reference to the collective bargaining agreement, did not file a
grievance, and apparently did not even know that the labor agree-
ment applied to the safety issue he raised. Thus, the court could
not conclude that the employee had an intention to implement
rights under the agreement. 0 6
In ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 0 7 three individuals were hired as
temporary janitor-cleaners and the next day, the company hired a
person to work as permanent janitor-cleaner. The collective bar-
gaining agreement provided that all were to serve on a probationary
basis for three months. Less than three months later, the three
temporary janitors were laid off due to a company "belt tighten-
ing" policy, but the permanent janitor was retained. When in-
formed of her layoff, one-of the employees, Ms. Williams, claimed
that she had greater seniority than the employee kept on the job.
She was informed by several supervisors, however, that probationary
employees had no seniority at all under the collective agreement,
and that in this layoff decision preference was given to the proba-
tionary permanent janitor over the probationary temporary jani-
tors. When Ms. Williams continued to make persistent inquiries
during her layoff about her opportunities for rehiring, she was
informed by management that she would not be re-employed be-
cause of her complaints. The Board found the refusal to recall
her an unfair labor practice, regardless of the merits of her position,
104193 N.L.R.B. 911 (1971), enforcement denied, 486 F.2d 977 (9th Cir.
1973).
'o5 486 F.2d at 978, 980.
106 Id. 979.
107 596 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1979).
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because she had referred to the collective bargaining agreement in
asserting priority in the matter of layoff and recall.108
The court of appeals, in a deplorably -reasoned opinion, re-
fused enforcement. Initially, the court felt obligated to reject
the Interboro doctrine by virtue of its earlier, pre-Interboro deci-
sion in NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Electric Cooperative, Inc.109
In that case, the court had found that three employees had engaged
in concerted activity when they individually complained, pursuant
to a common understanding, that the company had unfairly ap-
pointed a foreman from outside the workforce. Although Guernsey
had found those facts sufficient to warrant protection, the ARO
court distorted that decision and insisted that they were necessary-
Thus, under Guernsey-Muskingum, for individual action
to be deemed concerted action it must be shown that the
individual in fact was acting on behalf of, or as a represen-
tative of, other employees rather than acting for the bene-
fit of other employees only in a theoretical sense ...
We, therefore, decline to adopt the holding in Interboro.110
The court also went on to demonstrate that protecting Ms. Wil-
liams in this case would in any event have gone beyond the protec-
tion afforded in Interboro; the employee in Interboro was termi-
nated because he voiced complaints, but Ms. Williams was ter-
minated because of a lack of need for her work, and her complaints
were voiced only after she had been informed of her termination.
The distinction is totally spurious, because the alleged unfair labor
practice in ARO was not Ms. Williams's discharge but rather the
refusal to recall her from layoff, an adverse employment decision
made because of the complaints which Ms. Williams had com-
municated earlier to management.
Then, as if to buttress its decision with sound economic pol-
icy, the ARO court observed that the Board's decision below would
improperly interfere with the employer's contractual right to
judge a probationary employee's merit by constantly subjecting
management to the filing of grievances, in the form of NLRB
unfair labor practice charges, beyond those permitted by the labor
agreement. "Nothing in the language of the Act, nor its legisla-
tive history evidences an intent on the part of Congress so to in-
108227 N.L.R.B. 243 (1976), enforcement denied, 596 F.2d 713 (6th Cir.
1979).
109 265 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960). See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
110 596 F.2d at 717.
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trude into the day-to-day operation of an employer's business." "I'
Of course, Congress intends to do just that, when-regardless of the
lack of protection which might be afforded probationary employees
under a collective bargaining agreement-an employer has violated
the statutory rights of such employees to engage in concerted ac-
tivity for mutual aid or protection. The employer is forbidden
in no other way to judge the quality of probationary employees,
or to assign them work, or to terminate them altogether. The
court also summarily rejected the argument that section 9(a) should
be interpreted to protect from discharge or other discipline workers
who attempt to assert the right given by section 9(a) to present
and process grievances with the employer on an individual basis.
In summary, the principle announced by the ARO court is
that, in order for an individual claim or complaint to amount to
concerted activity, "it must be made on behalf of other employees
or at least be made with the object of inducing or preparing for
group action and have some arguable basis in the collective bar-
gaining agreement." 112 Assuming that the court intended to use
the conjunctive, its rule is far more stringent than that adopted
by any other court of appeals, because all other courts would deem
it sufficient that the individual complainant "induces or prepares
for group action" or (at least under Interboro and Ben Pekin)113
is derived from the labor contract.
114
Most recently, this troubling language was quoted with ap-
proval, and Interboro discredited and distinguished, by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Kohts v.
NLRB. n3 There, an employee refused an order to drive a truck
because he believed the brakes to be unsafe, a belief that the ad-
ministrative law judge found to be rooted in "ascertainable objec-
tive evidence." 11 Although the labor contract expressly provided
that an employee would not violate the agreement by refusing to
operate any equipment "unless such iefusal is unjustified," 117 the
111 Id. 718.
112 Id. (emphasis added).
113 See supra text accompanying note 76.
114 The same conjunctive also makes the court's rule subject to convincing attack
under the Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251
(1975), in which an individual's request for union representation at an investigatory
interview was held to be concerted activity, independent of any arguable basis in
the collective bargaining agreement for such a request.
115 629 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1390 (1981).
116 629 F.2d at 175-76. The administrative law judge, however, "expressly de-
dined to decide whether the truck brakes were. in fact unsafe." Id. 175.
117 Id. 175 n.8.
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employee was discharged for refusing to drive. The Board's find-
ing that his refusal was a protected concerted activity, under the
Interboro line of reasoning, was rejected by the court of appeals.
The court began by endorsing the view that the Interboro
doctrine was an "alternative holding," and a "clear expansion of
the Act's coverage, in the face of unambiguous words in the stat-
ute." 118 Thus, it viewed Interboro as "creat[ing] a legal fiction of
constructive concerted activity in the face of statutory language that
plainly protects workers who 'engage in concerted activity' for the
mutual aid and protection of other workers." 119 Although the
court concluded by noting that Interboro was in any event distin-
guishable from the case before it, as if to dull the edge of some of
its criticism of that case, the distinctions are clearly makeweight and
unconvincing, and the departure from Interboro patent. 120 The
court observed that its denial of unfair labor practice relief would
not leave Kohls without a remedy, because he could enlist the
union's aid to invoke the contractual grievance procedures.
This alternative is, of course, not available to an employee dis-
charged for making an individual complaint when there is no union
and no collective bargaining agreement. In these cases, the Board,
in extending statutory protection to the individual, has relied on
the theory that an individual protest is necessarily "on behalf of"
or "in the interest of" other workers when employer rectification
would inure to their benefit. But even the Second Circuit in Inter-
boro did not go so far as to endorse that theory in the absence of
a labor contract, and every court of appeals that has passed upon
that view of constructive concerted activity has flatly rejected it.
The courts have consistently applied the Mushroom Transportation
standard, and have required that the individual complainant act
"with the object of initiating or inducing or preparing for group
action or that the act have some relation to group action in the
interest of the employees." 121 Moreover, it has not been unusual
for courts to apply such a standard narrowly, so as to treat as a
118 Id. 176. The quotation was taken by the court from the opinion of the
Third Circuit court in Northern Metal. See supra text accompanying note 93.
119 Id. 177 (emphasis in original).
120 Kohls's conduct was found to be less "concerted" than that of the employee
in Interboro because: (1) he merely asserted that the truck was not safe enough
for him, (2) he did not act together with the union to protect other employees,
and (3) he withdrew a grievance which the union had filed on his behalf under
the labor contract. Id.
121 Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964), quoted
in Krispy Kreme, 635 F.2d at 307.
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,'personal gripe" conduct which without difficulty could have been
treated as concerted in fact.
A good example of this narrow application is Indiana Gear
Works v. NLRB,-' 2 which involved the Seventh Circuit's treatment
of an individual's wage protest in the absence of a collective bar-
gaining agreement. The problem started when the company
granted a wage increase of only two cents an hour. An employee,
who had earlier been reprimanded by management for his poor
attitude and excessive sarcasm, posted cartoons with his own cap-
tions ridiculing the wage increase and the company president. Al-
though the Board found that this activity was concerted and that
the employee's subsequent discharge because of this activity was a
violation of section 8(a)(1), the court reversed. The court was pre-
pared to assume the correctness of several of the Board's factual
findings: that other employees were dissatisfied with the wage in-
crease, that at least two other employees suggested captions for the
employee's cartoons, and that one of them posted a cartoon. The
court, however, found that the "casual assistance" of two other em-
ployees in the cartoon scheme was inadequate to constitute con-
certed activity. 23 It went on to state that to be concerted, activity
must be "for the purpose of inducing or preparing for group action
to correct a grievance or a complaint." 12-4 In this case, the court
concluded, no one had been designated as a spokesman for the em-
ployees and no employees had agreed among themselves to present
their views as a group. The employee, relying on his habitual
sarcasm, was merely gratifying his own personal whim.
Four years later, the same court appeared to narrow the reach
of Indiana Gear by treating it as a case in which "concerted" status
had been denied because the employee was motivated by "mal-
ice." 12 But recently, this court changed direction again and made
it clear that Indiana Gear must be read more broadly and that it
indeed announces an even stricter standard for concerted activity
than that of Mushroom Transportation. In Pelton Casteel, Inc. v.
NLRB, 126 the Board, placing some emphasis upon the fact that the
individual was supporting a unionization effort, found illegal a
written warning given to an employee for complaining about job
risks and mandatory overtime. The court of appeals refused en-
122 371 F.2d 273 (7th Cii. 1967).
123 Id. 277.
124 Id. 276.
325 NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
126 627 F.2d 23 (7th Cir. 1980).
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forcement, holding that the public venting of a personal grievance,
without purporting to be representing the views of others and with-
out inducing collective action, is not concerted activity, even though
the grievance was in fact shared by others, was complained about
by others individually, and was an issue that got many of the em-
ployees interested in unionizing. Fatal to the employee's claim was
the fact that he expressly complained only about his own situation,
and that neither he nor the other employees viewed him as rep-
resenting others in airing the grievance.1
27
Another frequently cited case narrowly construing the require-
ment of "concerted activity" outside the context of an existing
labor agreement is NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc.,128 a
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. There
a group of milk drivers over a period of roughly two years ex-
pressed concern and held meetings in response to the employer's
change from an hourly pay system to a commission system. After
the drivers had apparently become reconciled to the new system
and had signed new contracts, one of them continued to complain
about his commission rate and the commission system generally.
For those complaints, and for causing dissension, he was discharged.
The Board found that the discharge was for concerted activity, but
the court disagreed: "We are persuaded by the reasoning in North-
ern Metal . . . that a statutory basis for the concerted activity rule
announced in Interboro is questionable and hence we decline to
follow that decision." 129 The court also observed that even had it
chosen to follow Interboro, the employee's complaints would have
been unprotected because they "did not arise in the framework of
an attempt to enforce an existing collective bargaining agree-
ment."130  Applying Mushroom Transportation, the court found
inadequate support for any conclusion that the employee "was in-
viting the other drivers to join him in his protests and thereby was
seeking to instigate some form of group action." 131 He did not
purport to speak on behalf of other employees; he was never desig-
nated as their spokesman; his conversations with other employees
were not designed to arouse concerted action; and his complaints
127 The court treated its earlier decision in Ben Pekin as controlling. See supra
text accompanying note 75. It conceded, however, that the result would have been
different had the individual employee been attempting to enforce an existing col-
lective bargaining agreement. 627 F.2d at 28 & n.10.
128 481 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973).
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"were advanced entirely in pursuit of personal, not group, economic
goals.... Even if his success in this regard might have inured to
the benefit of the other drivers, it is an exceedingly tenuous basis
upon which to rest a finding of concerted activity." 132
Even the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the source
of the Interboro decision, has made it clear that the doctrine of
constructive concerted activity will have no role in a non-union
setting. The result the court reached in Ontario Knife Co. v.
NLRB 133 is particularly surprising because of the ease with which
it could have found concerted activity to have existed in fact. Three
women employees on the night shift were assigned a disproportion-
ate amount of work (in comparison with the day shift) riveting
knife handles to machetes, a job which was both dirty and lower
paying than other work to which they could have been assigned
under an incentive-pay arrangement. Two of the three women
were known by management to be rather constant complainers
about the situation, and they both approached a supervisor to dis-
cuss the matter. In the course of this discussion, they both stated
that the next time it was their turn to work on machetes they were
going to refuse. When their supervisor reiterated that if they did
not like the work they were assigned they could quit, the colloquy
got heated and one of the women, Ms. Cobado, returned, to her
machine, shut it down, and walked off the job in tears. Ms. Cobado
telephoned the next day to ask if she should report for work, but
she was later informed that she had been discharged for walking
off the job. The NLRB, mentioning the joint protest of Ms.
Cobado and her co-worker and the group concern reflected in Ms.
Cobado's walkout, found it to be protected concerted activity,
13
but the court of appeals disagreed.
The court parsed the language of section 7 and concluded that
it requires both an objective of "mutual aid or protection" and a
form of activity that is "concerted." 15 The former requirement
was satisfied by the fact that Ms. Cobado's co-worker shared her
objections to the machete work and jointly protested that work.
Thus, the discharge of either employee for this joint protest would
have violated the Act. But the court held that Ms. Cobado was
discharged not for complaining but for walking out, in which her
132 d.
133 637 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1980).
134 247 N.L.R.B. No. 168, enforcement denied, 637 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1980).
135 637 F.2d at 843.
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coworker did not join. The court read its decision in Interboro as
one in which "two employees were discharged and the court found
that the more vocal one was speaking on behalf of two others." 's
Furthermore, the court characterized as no more than dictum its
statement in that case that "activities involving attempts to enforce
the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement may be deemed
to be for concerted purposes even in the absence of such interest
by fellow employees." 137 The court agreed with other courts that
the dictum was properly limited to claims under labor contracts,
and concluded:
We think that, except in the context of agreements be-
tween an employer and his employees which are them-
selves the product of concerted activities, as in Interboro,
§ 7.. . should be read according to its terms. Not only
must the ultimate objective be "mutual" but the activity
must be "concerted" or, if taken by an individual 138 ....
must be looking toward group action. The Board did
not and could not reasonably find that Cobado was dis-
charged for making the protest in which Swift joined; she
was discharged and refused reinstatement because she
walked off her job.
All of the aforementioned appellate cases involved complaints
about wages, overtime, work assignments, and the like; none of
the cases involved any strong public policy reflected in governmental
regulations or statutes. It will be recalled that in cases of the latter
kind, the Board has been quick to apply the doctrine of construc-
tive concerted activity. In several recent decisions, the courts have
been just as quick to repudiate the doctrine in that context.
In NLRB v. Dawson Cabinet Co.,139 the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit overturned a potentially significant Board deci-
sion. In that case, a female employee was discharged for refusing
136 Id. 845.
137Id. (quoting Interboro, 388 F.2d at 499-500).
138 For authority, the court referred to the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975). But its narrow reading
of the Weingarten case as merely one in which an employee seeking the presence of
a union representative at an investigatory interview was "looking toward group
action" is not shared. In Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1980),
the court read Weingarten to adopt the Interboro approach by considering not
whether the individual's request was designed to induce or prepare for group action
or had a relation to group action in the interest of other employees, but rather by
focusing upon the effects upon the bargaining unit that would flow from union repre-
sentation at the interview.
139 566 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1977).
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to perform work unless given assurance that she would be paid as
much as the male employees performing the same work. The
Board found her conduct concerted and protected because her at-
tempt to enforce the statutory policies of title VII, banning sex
discrimination in employment, was per se in the interest of all
female employees of the company.140 The court disagreed. It en-
dorsed the Board's finding that the employee acted alone when she
refused the work; no other employee joined in her refusal or ap-
parently even shared her concern on the issue of equal pay. The
court rejected any expansion of the Interboro doctrine to cases in
which there was no collective bargaining agreement, quoting ex-
tensively from the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Buddies Super-
markets. The female employee who complained about unequal
pay was determined simply to solve a personal problem. Her dis-
charge was not for engaging in concerted activity but rather for her
failure to follow the company's reasonable directions as to her work
assignments.
141
Courts of appeals have reached like results in cases of formal
employee claims to government agencies, essentially rejecting the
Board's position in Alleluia Cushion. In Jim Causley Pontiac v.
NLRB,142 an employee was discharged for filing with the Michigan
Department of Public Health, under the state Safety and Health
Act, a complaint about excessive paint fumes in the workplace. The
court rejected the theory of Alleluia Cushion that there is implied
group participation in an individual's claim for enforcement of
safety legislation, and held instead that the complaining individual
must actually (and not merely constructively) represent the views
of other employees, even though it is not necessary that there be a
formal group designation.143  Applying that test, the court con-
cluded that the employee had engaged in concerted activity when
he filed his complaint with the department. This holding was
buttressed by the findings that a fellow worker had complained to
other employees and to management about the fumes, and had
agreed to the use of his name on the complaint. But the discharged
employee still could not win, unless on remand the Board could
reasonably conclude on the basis of the record evidence that the
140 228 N.L.R.B. 290, enforcement denied, 566 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1977).
141 The same court recently relied upon Dawson Cabinet while reiterating its
opposition to the doctrine of constructive concerted activity and its endorsement of
the Mushroom Transportation test. Koch Supplies, Inc. v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 1257
(8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
142 620 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1980).
143 Id. 125.
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employer knew that the filing of the complaint with the Depart-
ment of Public Health was on behalf of others beside the complain-
ing employee.
44
The Ninth Circuit, in a strikingly similar case, NLRB v. Big-
horn Beverage, 45 also concluded that an employee discharged for
telephoning to the Department of Health a complaint about car-
bon monoxide poisoning from truck fumes was not engaged in con-
certed activity. The court explicitly rejected Alleluia Cushion,
-finding it inconsistent with another decision in the same circuit in
which safety claims were found to be constructively concerted only
if they specifically referred to a collective bargaining agreement.146
In Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB ,'1 47 the Board found
the filing of a workmen's compensation claim presumptively to
reflect group conduct and participation. The Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, however, rejected this presumption and found
instead that there was "no proof of a purpose enlisting group action
in support of the complaint." 148 The court thus refused to over-
turn the employee's discharge, which the employer justified by the
employee's careless attitude toward safety and "a preoccupation
with filing claims for compensation." 149 In explaining its holding,
the court reviewed the many pertinent appellate decisions, finding
that the Mushroom Transportation test was sound and that Inter-
boro was in any event inapplicable because of the absence of a labor
contract. The court concluded that a finding of "concerted activity"
was "in effect a jurisdictional requirement" which had to rest on
fact and not on a "purely theoretical assumption." 150
1
4 4 1n invoking this "knowledge" requirement, the court relied upon its decision
in Air Surrey, Inc. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1979). See supra text accom-
panying notes 61-63.
145 614 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1980). Three other employees left work early that
day after being exposed to fumes. A physician who attended one of the sick em-
ployees telephoned a complaint to the Occupational Health Board. Id. 1242.
146 NLRB v. C & I Air Conditioning, Inc., 486 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1973). See
supra text accompanying note 103. The court made the same point once again in
NLRB v. Adams Delivery Serv., Inc., 623 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1980), in which con-
certed activity was found because the employee had asked the union to look into his
overtime claim under the labor contract.
14 635 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1980).
148 Id. 304.
1491d. 305. The claim in question was the employee's fourth in two years.
150 Id. 310.
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II. THE BETrER READING OF SECTION 7
The narrow reading of section 7 adopted by the vast majority
of the circuit courts is based entirely upon an abstract analysis of
statutory language. It proceeds on the general assumption that
there are two discrete categories of action, individual activity for
self-interest and concerted activity for mutual interest, and that
when Congress chose in terms to protect only "concerted activity for
mutual aid," it necessarily excluded individual activity for indi-
vidual aid from statutory protection. 51 This is a plausible reading,
given the precise text; but, as Justice Frankfurter once admonished,
statutes "are not abstract propositions. They are expressions of
policy arising out of specific situations and addressed to the attain-
ment of particular ends." 152
As the preceding analysis of the opinions of both the Board and
the courts of appeals evinces, the construction of the term "con-
certed activity" found in section 7 has resulted in statutory protec-
tion for an activity engaged in by two employees while the very
same activity engaged in by one remains unprotected. This extraor-
dinary anomaly suggests the need to reexamine the policies and
objectives embraced in the NLRA in order to ascertain whether
section 7 properly extends to individual activity. This more pre-
cise attention to the policy the statutory language sought to achieve
is entirely consistent with the history of judicial construction of the
NLRA.
The Supreme Court has frequently confronted policy choices
in which the precise language of the Labor Act supplied more of a
hurdle than a guide, and it is not unusual for the Court to invoke
legislative history to justify what appears on the surface to be a
departure from a rather clear congressional declaration. A perti-
nent illustration can be found in a case 153 construing the so-called
publicity proviso to the secondary boycott provisions of the Labor
Act; this proviso permits, at the location of a secondary employer,
"publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully ad-
vising the public, including consumers . . . that a product or prod-
151In Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1980), the Court
parsed the statute even more closely. Judge Friendly found that Angel Cobado's
protest was for "mutual aid or protection," inasmuch as she was joined by a co-
worker, but failed of "concert" when her co-worker declined to walk off the job with
her. Id. 844.
152 Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Coumm. L.
REv. 527, 533 (1947).
153 NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46 (1964).
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ucts are produced by an employer with whom a labor organization
has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer."154
The Court held that the proviso sheltered consumer handbilling
at a supermarket, even when the handbills called attention to a
dispute with a primary employer which was a distributor, rather
than a producer, of goods sold there. It justified this expansive,
and counter-literal, interpretation of the statutory language by in-
voking the protective purposes of Congress when it enacted the
proviso:
The proviso was the outgrowth of a profound Senate con-
cern that the unions' freedom to appeal to the public for
support of their case be adequately safeguarded. . . . It
would fall far short of achieving this basic purpose if the
proviso applied only in situations where the union's labor
dispute is with the manufacturer or processor .... There
is nothing in the legislative history which suggests that the
protection of the proviso was intended to be any narrower
in coverage than the prohibition to which it is an excep-
tion, and we see no basis for attributing such an incongru-
ous purpose to Congress.'5
One can readily supply other instances in which seemingly clear
statutory language was given a counter-literal meaning as a result
of the Court's attention to the underlying policy. 5 6
Thus, it is not at all self-evident that a reading of section 7
based solely on an abstract analysis of the language is necessarily
15429 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1976).
155 377 U.S. at 55.
156 In spite of the exclusion of picketing appeals from the shelter of the proviso
to § 8(b) (4), the Court concluded in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760,
377 U.S. 58 (1964), that some consumer picketing is in fact exempted from the
reach of that section. By the same token, § 8(a)(3) prohibits employer discrimina-
tion in terms and conditions of employment which is intended to discourage union
membership. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1976). The Court has held, however, that
some employer decisions violate that section despite the fact that the employer's
demonstrable intent is grounded solely in business judgment, NLRB v. Erie Resistor
Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963), and per contra the Court has held that the closing of an
entire business does not violate that section even when the employer's expressed
motivation is hostility to the employees' selected bargaining representative, Textile
Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
Yet another example can be found in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351
U.S. 105 (1956), in which the Court dealt with the § 7 right, accorded to "em-
ployees," to "form, join or assist labor organizations," a right ordinarily understood
to encompass the circulation of union literature. The Court held that although this
right could be invoked by employees of the company in question, it could not be
invoked by a full-time union organizer, in spite of the fact that the text of the
statute, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) (emphasis added), takes pains to provide that
an "employee" includes "any employee, and shall not be limited to the employee of
a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise."
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the only, let alone the best, available reading of the Act. How
that section should best be read turns upon an appreciation of the
provenance of section 7.
A. The History and Policy of Section 7
The phrase "other concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or
protection" is first found in federal law in section 2 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 57 a stattite limiting the power of federal courts to
issue injunctions in labor disputes. This Act was a reaction to the
extraordinary record of judicial excess in regulating labor under
the antitrust laws. 58 Because the language of section 2 was carried
over into the National Labor Relations Act, the Norris-LaGuardia
Act and its legislative history assume considerable significance.'59
At common law, many states regarded group protests with re-
gard to wages and working conditions as unlawful conspiracies. At
first, such group activity was criminally indictable; later, it was
treated as a civil wrong subject to injunctive relief. At the same
time, however, individual protests, whether in the form of a ver-
bal protest or a refusal to work, were perfectly lawful. 60 With the
enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890,161 outlawing com-
binations and conspiracies in restraint of interstate commerce, the
substance of the doctrine of unlawful conspiracy was imported from
the common law. As a result, the Sherman Act in the early years
of the twentieth century was applied by the federal courts to more
labor activity than business activity. 62  In response, Congress
enacted as part of the Clayton Act of 1914 an exemption for certain
labor activities from the reach of the Sherman Act and from all of
its criminal and civil sanctions.
63
The opening sentence of section 6 of the Clayton Act declares
that "[t]he labor of a human being is not a commodity or an article
of commerce." 16 Both the text and the underlying congressional
15729 U.S.C. §102 (1976).
158 See, e.g., I. BEsPau~sm, TBE IAN Yns-A HISTORY OF THE AMEmuCAN
Wor aE, 1920-1933, at 393-97 (1960).
'5929 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, 158(a)(1) (1976).
160 See R. GormAN, LAB oR LAw 2 (1976).
161 Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)).
162 See R. GorivA , supra note 160, at 3.
163 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976).
164 Id. This provision reads more like a manifesto than a piece of economic
legislation. Indeed, Samuel Gompers wrote: "Those words are sledge-hammer blows
to the wrongs and injustice so long inflicted upon the workers. The declaratory
legislation . . . is the Industrial Magna Carta upon which the working people will
rear their constructure of industrial freedom." Gompers, The Charter of Industrial
Freedom, Labor Provisions of the Clayton Antitrust Law, in 21 THE A2rmcAN
332 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
debate confirm that the principal purposes of this provision were
protection of individual liberty '16 and rejection of the theory that
conduct lawfully engaged in by an individual should nevertheless
be prohibited by law if engaged in by a group. As Senator Lewis
argued:
If it be true that the individual occupies such relation to
human life that, with regard to his personal welfare and for
the calling which he pursues, it has been the policy of the
law to exempt him from those rigors or those enactments
which apply to other associations, the fact that he may,
with others of his kind, join an association will not rob
him of that individual right that applies to him as a citi-
zen and as a person-of his status.166
True to this philosophy, section 20 of the Clayton Act insulated
from injunctive relief such peaceful devices as work stoppages,
picketing, and other activity "whether engaged in singly or in con-
cert." 167 By 1921, however, the Supreme Court chose to view the
Act as no more than declarative of preexisting law. 68 The Court's
frustration of congressional intent in the Clayton Act set the stage
for further legislative action.
In 1927, Senator Shipstead introduced a bill written by Andrew
Furuseth, president of the International Seaman's Union, narrowing
the definition of property which could be protected by injunctive
relief. 69 Although Furuseth was a popular (and colorful) figure,
and his bill had strong labor support, he was not a lawyer, and there
was a general consensus among those with a legal background that
his approach was doomed to failure. In response, a subcommittee
of the Senate Judiciary Committee invited four lawyers and an
economist to Washington in the spring of 1928 to draft a substitute.
This ad hoc drafting group consisted of Professors Felix Frank-
furter and Francis B. Sayre of the Harvard Law School, Herman
Oliphant of Columbia University, Edwin Witte, chief of the Wiscon-
FEmArromIsr 957, 971 (1914), reprinted in 51 CoNr. BEc. 16,340 (1914). The
provision was offered as an amendment on the Senate floor. 51 CoNG. REc. 14,590
(1914).
165 See, e.g., 51 CONG. REc. 14,588 (remarks of Sen. White); id. 14,589 (re-
marks of Sen. Vardaman).
166 Id. 14,586.
16729 U.S.C. §52 (1976).
168 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 469 (1921).
169S. 1482, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 69 CoNc. REc. 475 (1927), reprinted in I.
BEnr.CsTvN, supra note 158, at 395.
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sin Legislative Reference Library, and Donald Richberg, a Chicago
lawyer who had participated. in drafting the Railway Labor Act
(and who was later to lead the National Industrial Recovery Ad-
ministration). When this group convened in Washington, 170 it had
various drafts of proposed substitutes previously prepared by Frank-
furter and Sayre and by Oliphant.' 71 The overriding concern was
to draft a bill that would withstand constitutional challenge before
what was thought to be an inhospitable judiciary.
Frankfurter had circulated to the group beforehand a bill he
and Sayre had drafted in 1923 which he particularly commended to
the group and which focused upon substantive law. The bill pro-
vided for the insulation from legal prohibition of certain activities
growing out of a labor dispute whether engaged in "singly or in
concert," and further legalized "any act ...which might be law-
fully done by a single individual in the absence of such dispute or
industrial conflict." 172 It exempted from the law of criminal con-
spiracy "any act in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial
dispute between employers and employees ... if such act committed
by one person would not be punishable as a crime." 173 Indeed, it
stated as a general policy that it shall not be "unlawful to do any
act in pursuance ... [of the objectives of a labor organization] not
forbidden by law if done by a single individual." 174
A difference developed among the draftsmen, however, not over
the ultimate goals embodied in the draft, but only concerning the
170 According to Richberg's biographer, the entire group met for two days. T.
VADNmY, Tim WAYwmD LmERAL-A PorrcAL BIocaAPY oF DoNALD BICHMERG
86 (1970). But according to Witte's biographer, the group met for three days and
Sayre was unable to attend. T. SCHLABACH, EDwIN WrIT--CuInous REFOIIm
64 (1969). The latter account appears to be more accurate. On May 25, 1928
and July 14, 1928, Witte wrote to Senator Blaine and President Green (of the AFL)
respectively mentioning Sayre's absence, and the tenor of the correspondence with
Sayre indicates that he had not met with the group. Moreover, Witte's note on
the tentative draft reveals the group met for three days. The authors wish to
express their appreciation to the State Historical Society of Wisconsin for duplicating
much of the correspondence from the Witte papers and to David Rabban, Esq. of
the American Association of University Professors for culling a portion of the
Frankfurter papers.
171T. SCHLABACH, supra note 170, at 64.
172 Bill entitled "Revision of an Act Concerning Labor Organizations, § 4"
(April 9, 1923) (attached to Frankfurter's letter of transmittal of April 24, 1928)
(on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
173 Id. § 5.
174 Id. § 1. Frankfurter commended the draft to the group as a bill that he
and Sayre had "labored over a good many years and which seems to us to carry out
concretely the desirable and, indeed, the needed changes in the law." Letter from
Felix Frankfurter to Edwin Witte (April 24, 1928) (on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review).
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best practical approach to the problem. Witte doubted that the
courts would sustain any drastic change in substantive law, and
urged exclusively procedural reforms. 175 Frankfurter, who assumed
a major role in drafting, was persuaded. 7 6 The result, not un-
expectedly, was a compromise that attended largely to procedural
reform while adopting a declaration of policy that spoke to substan-
tive ends.'77 This policy statement was adopted as section 2 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act with but one alteration by Congress: 178
The public policy of the United States is hereby declared
as follows:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, devel-
oped with the aid of governmental authority for owners of
175Letter from Edwin Witte to Francis Sayre (May 26, 1929); letter from
Edwin Witte to Senator Blaine (Nov. 3, 1928) (on file with the University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review). Sayre, who did not attend the Washington meeting, argued
for a substantive change in the law with some vehemence. Francis Sayre, "Sug-
gestions and Criticisms of Mr. Francis B. Sayre with regard to proposed Tentative
Draft of Bill Limiting the Use of Injunctions" (May 17, 1928) (on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review). See -also Sayre, Labor and the Courts,
39 YAE L.J. 682 (1930).
176 See letter from Edwin Witte to Senator Blaine (Nov. 3, 1928); letter from
Edwin Witte to Francis Sayre (May 26, 1928). Shortly after this exchange, Frank-
furter wrote to Witte:
I am in substantial accord with the views you express to Sayre. I
think one bill should concentrate on the procedural abuses of the injunction
to the exclusion of modifications of the substantive law, either civil or
criminal. Personally, as I have told Sayre and as I have written to our
associates, I should confine this bill to the procedural features governing
injunctions. Let's see how far we can get with comprehensive, adequate
corrections of the procedural evils. Substantive law can be dealt with
separately, so far as necessary. I think there is better chance of passage of
a procedural measure and better likelihood of securing its fair interpretation
and observation by the courts, if we do not over-load it either with doubt-
ful substantive provisions or, at all events, provisions which run counter to
the deeper hostilities of the judges.
Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Edwin Witte (May 29, 1928) (all letters on file
with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
177T. SCHI.ABACr supra note 170, at 65. See also Witte, The Federal Anti-
Injunction Act, 16 Mn-N. L. REv. 638, 646-47 (1932).
178 Memorandum, "Tentative Draft" (with notation "Final Draft as Worked
Out at Conference at Washington May 1-3, 1928") (on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review) [hereinafter cited as "Tentative Draft"].
After the bill was proposed, the need for such a statement of policy was
debated. See, e.g., 75 CoNG. 1Ec. 5465 (1932) (remarks of Rep. Michener);
Christ, The Federal Anti-Injunction Bill, 26 ILL. L. REv. 516, 521 (1932). It was
argued that, in terms of legal effect, the statement was only "useful rhetoric" to
guide the courts. F. FRANKFmTER & N. GaENE, THE LABoR INJUNC'ToN 212
(1930). As a Supreme Court Justice, Frankfurter took a rather different view of
the practical effect of § 2. See infra note 221. Indeed, Frankfurter especially
among the drafters believed in the importance of the provision. F. F-ANKFoma
& N. GREENE, THE LABoR INJUNCTION 212 (1930); Frankfurter & Greene, Con-
gressional Power Over the Labor Injunction, 31 CoLrar. L. REV. 385, 389 (1931).
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property to organize in the corporate and other forms of
ownership association, the individual unorganized worker
is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract
and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain
acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore,
though he should be free to decline to associate with his
fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of asso-
ciation, self-organization, and designation of representatives
of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions
of his employment, and that he shall be free from the in-
terference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or
their agents, in the designation of such representatives or.
in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection .... 179
Like the ringing language of section 6 of the Clayton Act,
the persistent focus of the more detailed language of section 2 of
Norris-LaGuardia is upon the freedom of the individual-"freedom
of labor, .... freedom of association," and freedom "from the inter-
ference, restraint, or coercion of employers." Just as in the debate
over the Clayton Act, much stress was placed in the debate on
Norris-LaGuardia upon the need to protect individual liberty, even
to the point of the Senate's insistence upon the insertion of the
clause "though he should be free to decline to associate with -his
fellows," 180 which was not included in the draft produced by the
ad hoc committee. The extraordinary scope of injunctions was
pointed to again and again as an infringement of civil rights: prohib-
iting the payment of family assistance to strikers; prohibiting the dis-
semination of information concerning a labor dispute, even of the
fact that such a dispute existed, and prohibiting an individual to
appeal an eviction from company housing-a right otherwise con-
ferred by state law.'8 '
As in section 20 of the Clayton Act, section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act listed several forms of activity, including work stop-
17929 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
18075 CONG. REc. 4755 (1932). See H.R. Rep. No. 793, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.
6 (1932).
181See, e.g., 75 CoNG. REc. 5467 (1932) (remarks of Rep. Greenwood); id.
5490 (remarks of Rep. Celler); id. 5491 (remarks of Rep. Hill); id. 5515 (remarks
of Rep. Schneider); id. 5487 (remarks of Rep. Sparks). Indicative of the tone of
the debate are the remarks of Senator Norris; "[Tihe real object of the injunction
is not to protect property but to restrain the constitutional rights of individuals and
thus to interfere with human liberty," id. 4502, and Rep. Oliver: ."It is strange, in
the field of American freedom where laws do not govern but men alone reign, that
the most powerful impulse of these free rulers is toward tyranny." Id. 5481.
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pages and piblicity, which when carried out in a labor dispute-
"whether singly or in concert" l2-were not to be enjoined by a
federal court. Moreover, the definition of a "labor dispute" in sec-
tion 13 of the act indisputably embraces a dispute between at em-
ployer and a single employee, not merely as to matters of association
and group representation but as to "any controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment." 18 As in the case of section 2,
despite refinement in other regards, section 13's treatment of the
individual was simply not in controversy; it went unmodified in
both the drafting group's later changes in the draft and in the Con-
gress.'84 The whole emphasis of the Act was upon the helplessness
of the individual worker. As Senator Norris argued in debating
section 3, rendering the "yellow-dog" contract unenforceable:
[B]y the combination of large corporations in a particular
line of business, the laboring man must accept uncondi-
tionally the, terms laid down by the employer. He is
absolutely helpless under such contracts. His family can-
not have -food to eat or clothes to wear unless he gets a job.
If he gets a job, he must surrender his liberty. He must,
for the time being, become a slave. He cannot associate
with his fellows. In connection with his fellows he cannot
present. a grievance to the employer. He has agreed to
make no such demand. If conditions become unbearable,
his only remedy is to go alone and face the big combina-
tion of perhaps millions of wealth. He must singly present
any grievance he has. He must abide by the decision which
is thus given him. He has no appeal. He has no oppor-
tunity to join with his fellows and make his demands effec-
tive. In effect, if he must live and support his family and
clothe his children, he must surrender his liberty.z8
The assumption of the Act was not that action which should be
protected when engaged in by a group should be left unprotected
when engaged in by the individual, but that lawful individual
action should not become unlawful when engaged in collectively.
8
18229 U.S.C. § 104 (1976). See id. § 52 (Clayton Act).
:182 Id. § 113.
184The subsequent exchanges among the draftsmen focused rather intensively
upon the Tentative Draft's definition of a "labor dispute," but it does not appear that
it was ever suggested that a dispute with an individual employee should be ex-
empted from statutory reach. See "Tentative Draft," supra note 178.
18575 CoNG. RBc. 4504 (1932) (emphasis added).
186 One student of the Norris-LaGuardia Act has concluded that the rights con-
ferred by it "were intended to be protected whether exercised by a single individual
or by a group." Lynd, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activity After Union
Recognition: A Study of Legislative History, 50 IND. L.J. 720, 727 (1975).
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By its terms, however, the Norris-LaGuardia Act only regulated
the power of federal courts; section 2 was, in Frankfurter's terms,
simply "useful rhetoric" to guide judicial construction-it did not
otherwise limit the power of employers over employees. A partial
step toward the regulation of employers was taken in the National
Industrial Recovery Act, which required the adoption of codes of
fair competition regulating industry.187 As submitted to Congress,
section 7(a) of that Act provided that each code contain a condition
that "employees shall have the right to organize and bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing." 188 In
testifying before the House Ways and Means Committee, William
Green, President of the American Federation of Labor, urged that
that provision be amended to include, "And shall be free from the
interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their
agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organi-
zation or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 1n9 He pointed out
that the proposed provision was "a verbatim statement from the
declared policy of the Government as set forth in the Norris-
LaGuardia anti-injunction law" -10 and so represented no departure
from established policy. The Congress proved amenable and the
NIRA adopted the language of Norris-LaGuardia. 191
The experience under the NIRA proved to be a great dis-
appointment to organized labor and to Senator Wagner, who chaired
the National Labor Board.' 9-° Of special concern was the widespread
formation of employee representation plans (which had once been
encouraged as a matter of national labor policy but had been in
decline since the advent of the Depression) ostensibly to comply
with section 7(a). As a result, Senator Wagner set to work on a
separate labor bill well before the NIRA was struck down. in
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.19 1 Not surprisingly, the
language of section 2 of Norris-LaGuardia, which was reiterated in
187 Ch. 90, § 7, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). See infra note 191.
188 RLB. 5664, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. §7(a)(1) (1933).
189 National Industrial Recovery: Hearings on H.R. 5664 Before the Houser
Comm. on Ways and Means 117, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) (statement of William
Green).
lO Id.
191 Ch. 90, § 7(a), 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (struck down in Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
1 92 See generally I. BmmsTEN, TiE NEW DEAL CoLL~crv BAR AnNG Poricy
(1950).
193 295 U.S. 495 ('1935).
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section 7(a) of the NIRA, was adopted in sections 7 and 8(1) of the
NLRA. Section 7 conferred the right to organize, bargain, and
engage in "other concerted activities for the purpose of-. mutual
aid 'or protection." '19 Section 8(1) adopted Norris-LaGuardia's
aspiration that the employee should be "free from the interference,
restraint, or coercion of employers" 195 in the exercise of those rights
and turned it from a mere preamble for a statute limiting equity
jurisdiction into positive law firmly limiting employer action. 196
It seems rather clear that one of the objectives of the NLRA
was to take the same forms of conduct which the Clayton and Norris-
LaGuardia Acts had declared protected against governmental sanc-
tion and declare them as well to be protected against private sanc-
tion through employer coercion and discipline. All of this legisla-
tion, to be sure, was focused principally upon the protection of
group action for the purpose of improving wages and working con-
ditions. But there is not the slightest hint in the history of the
NLRA that in attempting to expand the protection that the law
would give to group activity to secure benefits or improvements,
Congress contemplated a less favored status for individual activity
having the same objective. Throughout the development of the
common law and the construction of the federal antitrust laws, this
individual activity was accepted as lawful and was singled out for
protection under section 20 of the Clayton Act 19 and even more
explicitly under sections 4 and 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 98
Thus the history of the phrasing of section 7 leads to a rather
different reading than the narrow, if literal, view adopted by the
courts of appeals and, in essence, by the Board as well. The ques-
tion is whether this more generous reading better comports with
the broader policy goals of the Act. In construing the NLRA, the
Supreme Court has admonished that section 7 rights are protected
"'not for their own sake but as instruments of national labor pol-
icy." 199 The Court has stressed that aspect of federal policy which
fosters the institution of collective bargaining and the achievement
of industrial stability. That such is the policy of the Act cannot
194Ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976)).
195 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). See id. § 102 (1976) (Norris-LaGuardia).
196 Ch. 372, §8(1), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)
(1976)).
19729 U.S.C. § 52 (1976).
19829 U.S.C. §§ 104, 113 (1976).
'99 Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50,
62 (1975).
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be gainsaid. But an additional element thought to undergird, the
Act and its antecedents in the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts
was the achievement of "industrial democracy," despite the subor-
dinating context of the employment relationship.10 To the con-
temporary ear, the appeal of an earlier period to "industrial de-
mocracy" may sound like a shibboleth; but that appeal was taken
very seriously at the time, it did have weight, and it necessarily
informs the policy of the law. As the Court observed about con-
struing the NLRA, the judicial function is to "reconstitute the
gamut of values current at the time when the words were
uttered." 201
The idea of "industrial democracy," despite the variety of mean-
ings that were attached to it, grew out of a widely shared perception
of a social problem and came to have at least one thread of meaning
common to most of -those accustomed to employ the term. The
social problem was the stark fact of a permanent laboring class, its
members dependent for the duration of their working lives upon
wages, and so subject to the autocratic control of the employer. In
the mid-nineteenth century, wage earning was thought to be a mere
way station to independence as farmer, artisan, or entrepreneur;
those who failed to achieve economic independence could only
blame themselves. By the time of the passage of the Clayton Act,
that simple faith had been convincingly contradicted by experi-
ence.202 As a leading study has pointed out, the development of a
200 In his Presidential Message of May 20, 1919, Woodrow Wilson opined:
The object of all reform in this essential matter must be the genuine
democratization of industry, based upon a full recognition of the right of
those who work, in whatever rank, to participate in some organic way in
every decision which directly affects their welfare and the part they are
to play in industry. Some positive legislation is practicable.
58 CONG. REc. 40 (1919).
201 National Woodwork Mfg. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 620 (1967).
202 Note, for example, the remarks of Representative Bailey about Abraham
Lincoln in the debate on the Clayton Act:
Freedom was [Lincola's] watchword, and he turns aside in a grave state
paper, dealing with the perplexities of war and the mighty problems
vhich rebellion thrust upon him, to felicitate the country on the fact that
there was not of necessity any such thing as the free hired laborers being
fixed to that condition of life.
Many independent men everywhere . . a few years back in
their lives were hired laborers. The prudent, penniless beginner in
the world labors for wages a while, saves a surplus with which to
buy tools or land for himself, then labors on his own account another
while, and at length hires another new beginner to help him. This
is the just and generous and prosperous system which opens the way
to all, gives hope to all, and consequent energy and progress and
improvement of condition to all. No men living are more worthy to
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permanent, economically dependent social class was widely thought
to challenge the democratic foundations of the Republic.2 3 "Must
not this mean," wrote Louis Brandeis, "that the American who is
brought up with the idea of political liberty must surrender what
every citizen deems far more important, his industrial liberty? Can
this contradiction-our general political liberty and this industrial
slavery-long coexist? Either political liberty will be extinguished
be trusted than those who toil up from poverty; none less inclined to
take or touch ought which they have not honestly earned. Let them
beware of surrendering a political power which they already possess
and which, if surrendered, will surely be used to close the door of
advancement against such as they and to fix new disabilities and
burdens upon them until all of liberty shall be lost.
These words were written over 50 years ago. What has become of
that just and generous and prosperous system which then opened the way
to all, gave hope to all, and consequent energy and progress and improve-
ment of condition to all? Can it now be truly said that labor is not fixed
to that condition of life? Lincoln said that labor was not so fixed in his
day. Can you say as much in 1914? The prudent, penniless beginner of
his time labored for wages a while, then he began working for himself,
and then he became an employer. Has the beginner in my State of Penn-
sylvania any such spur to energy? Largely speaking, is there any hope
for him ever to cease working for wages? Can he ever seriously aspire
to rise much higher than to a petty foremanship? Is there one chance in a
hundred thousand that he may become himself an employer?
51 CoNG. REc. 9155 (1914).
203 D. Rooms, Tim Wont ETmc wN INmusnmr.A AMEmcA, 1850-1920, at 57
(1978). This formed part of Washington Gladden's call for reform in 1911.
So shall we realize our democracy. It has never been anything more
than the skeleton of a democracy; so long as industry is feudalistic it
cannot be. But when the common man is emancipated and called into
partnership by the captain of industry, we shall have a real democracy.
No superhuman vision is needed to discern the fact that the confusions and
corruptions of our political democracy are largely due to the disorganizing
influence of this industrial feudalism, in constant contact with it, and con-
tinually thrusting its alien conceptions and ideals into the political arena.
When industry is fairly democratized, it will be much easier to reform
our politics.
W. G.ADD N, Tim LABOR QUESTION 99-100 (1911); see also N. WArE, LABOR w
MoDEBN INDusTmwAL SocIETY 430 (1935):
During and immediately after the war there was a great deal of talk
and agitation about "industrial democracy." This, of course, meant dif-
ferent things to different people. The existence of autocratic sovereignty
in industrial affairs alongside "democracy" in political matters had always
given rise to criticism and to suggestion that some degree of democratic
control in industry might be desirable. But the war for "democracy" gave
a new impetus to these ideas. The workers in 1918-1919, intellectuals
attached to their cause, and many employers were converted to a new but
vague conception of democratic control in some degree in industry. It was
generally admitted that there was something strange about a situation in
which, after the Nineteenth Amendment, all citizens of age might help to
choose their representatives in political government of which they knew
little and were denied any shadow of self-government in industry of which
they knew much more.
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or industrial liberty must be restored." 204 This perception .was
shared by thoughtful employers 2 05 and reformers, 2 6 including, espe-
cially, Senator Wagner.2
07
A variety of proposals were offered to deal with the perceived
conflict between political liberty and industrial autocracy: the in-
dustrial cooperative movement, public ownership of business, sci-
entific management, employee works councils, and the palliative
of welfare capitalism. By the time of the NLRA, however, the
major confrontation had devolved into one between employer-
sponsored employee representation plans and trade unionism, both
laying claim to the banner of "industrial democracy." A key fea-
ture of company unionism was a grievance procedure through which
the individual could complain of the treatment accorded him. Not
infrequently, these plans provided for binding arbitration by a
joint employee-management committee or by an outside neutral.208
2 04 L. BRANDns, THE CuRsE OF BIcNEss 39 (1934).
2 0 5 And it is still harder to see how we can much longer send Jones the
worker in steel or shoes or sealing-wax to the exercise of his rights as an
American, and if an industrial order in which he is habituated to an auto-
cratic control that was old before his country was born.
A. FILENu, A MEanaCier's HoRIzON 47 (1924). The Filenes were closely associated
with Brandeis, and sponsored one of the more successful employee representation
plans in their department store in Boston. See M. LADAME, THE FrtNE SToPX
(1930).
So, too, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. addressed the National Industrial Conference
in 1919, a few years after he had introduced an extensive employee representation
system in the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company (in the face of the infamous
"Ludlow Massacre" of 1914), in terms like those of Brandeis and Filene: "Surely
it is not consistent for us as Americans to demand democracy in government and
practice autocracy in industry." J. Roc=r.zLum, ThE PERSONAL RELATION Iw
INDUsTnY 86 (1923).
200 "To put it bluntly, an economic autocracy and a democratic government
cannot support each other long. There will be an eventual choice between the
ideals of mastery and service." D. RICHmERG, THE RAiNBow 47 (1936). See also
N. ZucEmR, GCEoRcE W. NoRRIs 53 (1966) ("Norris astutely realized that political
democracy was impossible without economic democracy, and that the only way to
achieve and insure both was to champion the affirmative state.").
207 In the debate on the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Senator Wagner argued: "If
into this condition of affairs [the accumulation of capital] we should inject the
archaic notion of master and servant, what kind of citizenship will inhabit the
continent in the next generation?" 75 CoNG. Inc. 4918 (1932).
In 1937, Wagner wrote: "Let men become the servile pawns of their masters
in the factories of the land and there will be destroyed the bone and sinew of
resistance to political dictatorship." Fleming, The Significance of the Wagner Act,
in LAnoR Arm I'm NEw DEAL 121, 135 (M. Derber & Young, eds. 1972). Senator
Wagner's deeply felt belief in this is significant not merely because he was the
sponsor of the NLRA; by all accounts he was the prime mover whose efforts to
secure passage were virtually singlehanded. See J. HuixiAcmER, SENATOR RoBEmr
F. WAGNEm AND THE RosE oF UnBAN LmRALImm 189-98 (1968).
208E. BURTON, EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION 169 (1926); C. FREcNC, THE SHOP
Comirrn In 'im UNI=ED STATES 61 (1923).
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The difference between the proponents of company unionism and
trade unionism "was not one of political theory, but of implementa-
tion," 209 and should not obscure the assumption shared in com-
mon between them. "[T]he industrial democracy plans," writes
the historian Daniel Rodgers, "all looked toward reconstruction of
the factories on essentially political and constitutional lines. Some-
where between independence and servitude they hoped to create
something akin to industrial citizenship." 210 As William Leiserson
(who later testified in favor of the Labor Act and was to serve as a
member of the labor board) had earlier opined:
[T]he fact now remains that Personnel Management and
Trade Unionism now agree "in principle," as the diplo-
mats put it. Both accept what might be called the citizen-
ship theory of labor relations, in place of the older theories
that considered labor as a commodity, or a machine.
These older theories guaranteed no rights, privileges, or
immunities for the wage earner in an industry which man-
agement was bound to respect.211
209 Fleming, supra note 207, at 135. See generally NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CON-
FRENCE BoARD, Comz.cmvx BARGAINING THRouGH EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION
(1933).
210 D. RODGERS, supra note 203, at 61. "It was this nerve," Rodgers writes,
"that John Leitch touched so effectively." Id. (referring to J. LErca, MAN TO
MAN: A STORY OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1919)). As Samuel Haber wrote of
Leitch's approach:
Leitch simply presented a literal-minded application of Brandeis' rhetorical
pronouncement that the nineteenth century had been the century of
political democracy and the twentieth would be the century of industrial
democracy. He transferred the apparatus of a modified American consti-
tution to the factory. There was a "House of Representatives," usually
elected by a meeting of all employees below the rank of foreman; a
"Senate," consisting of superintendents and foremen;' and a "Cabinet,"
composed of executive officers and presided over by the president There
were speakers of the House, presidents of the Senate, legislative com-
mittees, bills passed, Roberts' Rules of Order followed, etc ..... His pro-
gram seemed to appeal especially to those who were just coming to accept
the existence of the large, permanent working class of large-scale industry
but who longed for the old, supposedly harmonious, employer-worker
relationship of small-scale enterprise ....
S. HABER, EFFICIENCY AND UPLIFT: ScxEN~TFc MANAGEMENT IN THE PRoGRESrvE
ERA, 1890-1920, at 125 (1964). Haber points out that even the otherwise skeptical
Holmes waxed enthusiastic about Leitch's ideas. Id. 124-25.
2 1 1 Leiserson, Contributions of Personnel Management to Improved Labor Re-
lations, WERmmn LET UREs ON INDusTRAL RELATrIoNs 1928, at 125, 160 (1929).
Leiserson had served as Executive Secretary of the National Labor Board, estab-
lished under the NIRA, and was called upon by Senator Wagner for assistance in
drafting the NLRA. I. BERNSTEIN, TuRnUrLNT YEARs-A HISTORY OF TnE AMERICAN
WopKE, 1933-1941, at 186 (1970).
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The proponents of company unionism sought to give the in-
dividual the right to present his grievance; the proponents of trade
unionism sought to expand that right to representation by outsiders.
But in both cases, the right of the individual to complain was not
seriously contested.212  The exercise of that right, as an attribute
of industrial citizenship, was explicitly described by Edwin Witte,
who argued before the Senate Committee for the right of the indi-
vidual in an organized plant to present a grievance independent of
the union:
The right to petition, the right to lay grievances before
Congress is a right that any individual and every group
must have. Similarly, in industrial government, the right
of petition, the right to lay grievances before the employer
seems to me a right that every group should be accorded,
and every individual. As a matter of fact, that is all the
employers that are promoting company unions have in
mind.2
13
His concerns were accommodated in the proviso to section 9(a).
The appeal to individual civil rights, which had been a strong
element in support of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts,214
was made even more strongly in the debate over the NLRA; but
now the argument was for civil rights at the workplace rather than
freedom from judicial control. The bill, argued Representative
Mead, "creates a democracy within industry which gives our indus-
trial workers the same general idea of freedom which the founding
fathers conferred upon citizens of the United States." 215 Repre-
212 Clyde Summers has correctly pointed out that company unions did not pro-
tect the individuals against retaliation if they did speak up. Summers, Industrial
Democracy: America's Unfulfilled Promise, 28 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 29, 33 (1979).
But retaliation for submitting a grievance would defeat the whole purpose of the
plan which, in part, was to avoid unionization. Thus, as Milton Derber observes,
"The most widespread advance toward industrial democracy in the tventies came
in the area of due process for employee complaints. In this respect the employee-
representation plans contributed about as much (and in the same manner) as the
unionized situation." M. Derber, Tim AMERCAN IDRA or L rUSTmJr DEMOCRACY
1865-1965, at 276 (1970).
213 NATIONAL LABoR RELATIONS BOARD, LEGISLATIV HISTORY OF THE NA-
TIoNAL LABoR RELATIONS ACT 1935, at 273 (1949) (testimony of Edwin Witte)
[hereinafter cited as LEGISLATrvE HISToRY].
214 President Wilson spoke of the Clayton Act in terms of "emancipation" and
of the treatment of workingmen as "responsible individuals." I MESSAGES AND
PAPEmS OF WooDnow WILSON 302, 307 (1924). Senator Norris later reflected upon
the Act that bore his name as a "[Liaw that attempts to safeguard and protect the
liberties of the individual man." G. NoRus, FIGHTING LmmBERAL 316 (1945).
215 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 213, at 3180-81.
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sentative Wood argued, "Ever since human history began, in the
days of absolutism, in the days of feudalism and serfdom, and
finally, under our democratic and capitalistic system, the struggle
of the ages has revolved around a desire for freedom, and all
this bill is designed to do is to make men free." 218 Representative
Truax put it even more flamboyantly, "As Lincoln freed the blacks
in the South, so the Wagner-Connery bill frees the industrial slaves
of this country from the further tryranny and aggression of the
overlords of wealth." 217 These several themes are reflected in the
Senate Committee's report on the precursor bill to the Labor Act:
The first unfair labor practice restates the familiar law
enacted by Congress in section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act .... The language restrains employers from attempt-
ing by interference or coercion to impair the exercise by
employees of rights which are admitted everywhere to be
the basis of industrial no less than political democracy.
218
Accordingly, the history of the language of section 7 and an
examination of the policy it was designed to effect suggest a far
more expansive reading-one that encompasses the individual's right
to complain and to act in his own self-interest. It is anomalous to
read the Act to provide that an individual who protests of mis-
treatment can be summarily fired unless he is accompanied by a
fellow worker making the same complaint. It is even more
anomalous that a letter written by an individual worker to a super-
visor should render him subject to discharge while a disruptive
mass work stoppage in the midst of the workday should be pro-
tected. Such anomalies could be tolerated if it were clearly the
will of the legislature; but the policy of the Act is to ensure the
liberty and dignity of the individual working person. The dis-
charge of one individual because he or she has had the temerity
to complain to the employer is no less a naked exercise of auto-
cratic power than the discharge of two, and the lesson to other
employees is no less clear. In terms of statutory construction, there
are not two abstract and distinguishable categories of action-in-
dividual action for self-interest and collective action for mutual
interest-one which Congress chose not to protect and the other
which Congress chose to protect, but rather a continuum of indi-
vidual activity-of individuals choosing to speak and act on their
216 Id. 3177.
217 Id. 3185.
218 S. REP. No. 1184, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1934), reprinted in LmCrsLATr €
HIsToRY, supra note 213, at 1103.
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own behalf, singly and in small and large groups. 19  Thus, the
narrow reading of the Act proceeds upon a false dichotomy, for at
the core of the freedom of the individual to protest in a group
necessarily lies the freedom of the individual to protest at all.
Merely because Congress, for historically explicable reasons, chose
in framing section 7 to emphasize out of that continuum of indi-
vidual activity only the controversial aspect of combination is no
reason to read the noncontroversial, lesser included activity out of
the Act's "omnibus guaranty of freedom." 220 As Justice Holmes
explained while sitting on the circuit court:
219 In the debate on the Clayton Act, Senator White argued:
I do not believe, as we are sometimes told, that one man has not
the right to personally persuade another man not to work when they are
both in a place where they have a right to be, and it makes no difference
whether there are a few or whether there are many present. He has the
right to use that persuasion to a thousand as well as to a lesser number.
51 CoNG. REc. 14,588 (1914).
220 Senator Wagner testified on the need to articulate the Act's unfair labor
practices "without in any way placing limitations upon the broadest reasonable
interpretation of its omnibus guaranty of freedom." LEGISLATIVE HISTOnY, supra
note 213, at 1414. A contrary view is reflected, however, in Ontario Knife Co. v.
NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 845-46 (2d Cir. 1980), in which the court held that an
employee's discharge did not violate the NLRA because the individual activity did
not satisfy the "concerted" requirement. That court took notice of the Senate
Report accompanying the NLRA, admonishing that: "'Neither the National Labor
Relations Board nor the courts are given any blanket authority to prohibit whatever
labor practices that in their judgment are deemed to be unfair."' Id. 843 n.4
(quoting S. RiP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935)). The court then con-
cluded that, "in dealing with a situation as that here presented, courts should
adhere rather closely to the statutory text." Id. 843.
The quoted portion of the Senate Report adds little to the inquiry, however,
for the Report merely addresses the question whether the Board, like the Federal
Trade Commission, should enjoy a broadly delegated power to declare practices to
be "unfair." The issue in Ontario Knife, on the other hand, was whether the indi-
vidual's protest was protected by § 8(a) (1). On that question, the Senate Report
is consistent with Senator Wagner's view, for the Report adverts to the specific
unfair labor practices spelled out in §§ 8(2)-(5) as not imposing 'limitations or
restrictions upon the general guarantees of the first." S. REP. No. 573, at 9,
reprinted in LE ISLAIVf IsToRY, supra note 213, at 2309 (emphasis added).
In fact, the Report points out that "the unfair labor practices listed in this bill
are supported by a wealth of precedent in prior Federal law," includingi inter alia,
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. S. REsa. No. 573, at 8-9, reprinted in LEcISLATr
HISToRY, supra note 213, at 2308. Thus, the Second Circuit's conclusion in Ontario
Knife simply does not follow. The absence of an adequate explanation why only
"concert" of action seems to be protected, in the face of the extraordinary anomaly
produced by a literal reading, merely suggests the need for closer examination of the
policy the Act sought to establish (in part by resort to the "wealth of precedent" in
prior law that assists that inquiry), not capitulation to the dictionary. Curiously, the
court relied upon a student note which concluded that the requirement of concert of
action should simply be read out of the statute. Id. 843 (citing Note, The Re-
quirement of "Concerted" Action Under the NLRA, 53 CoLOm. L. REV. 514, 529
(1953)). Another student commentator has more recently come to the same
conclusion. Note, Individual Right for Organized and Unorganized Employees
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 58 TEx. L. REv. 991 (1980).
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The Legislature has the power to decide what the policy
of the law shall be, and if it has intimated its will, however
indirectly, that will should be recognized and obeyed....
[T]he change in policy that induces the enactment, may
not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate discharge
of duty for the courts to say: We see what you are driving
at, but you have not said it, and therefore we will go on
as before.22l
B. The Practical Implications of Protecting
the Individual
Not only does the meaning here proposed for the term "con-
certed activity" in section 7 best comport with the legislative pur-
pose, but it also has a number of other significant benefits. It is
more consistent with Board and court precedents on closely related
issues, and it will eliminate harsh and unwarranted artificialities
that have developed in the law under the prevailing judicial con-
struction (and even the Board's construction) of section 7.
The construction of section 7 proposed here gives protection to
individual conduct which makes no less of an appeal to congressional
solicitude than kindred forms of conduct which have been held-in
Board and court decisions, including those of the Supreme Court-
to be protected against discipline. The National Labor Relations
Act itself requires that an individual employee be protected when
filing a charge with or giving testimony before the NLRB, regard-
less whether he is acting alone and out of self-interest.212 The theory
is that "self-interest" is beside the point, for the individual is acting
221Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908); see Cabell v.
Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), aff'd 326 U.S. 404 (1945). (Judge Learned
Hand observed: "[Ilt is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are
the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning
of any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or anything else. But it is one of the
surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out
of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object
to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to
their meaning."). See also United States v. Klinger, 199 F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir.
1952), aff'd per curiam, 345 U.S. 979 (1953); United States v. Hutcheson, 312
U.S. 219, 235 (1941) (Justice Frankfurter's later treatment of his own handiwork
in the Norris-LaGuardia Act).
222 Section 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(4) (1976). See Gunnels Indus.
Painters, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 599 (1972). In this case, an employee who was dis-
charged for slow work picketed and threatened to complain to the NLRB's regional
office; it was held unlawful for a supervisor to condition his willingness to suggest
reinstatement upon the dischargee's dropping his complaint to the Board. Indeed,
although the picketing was held not to be protected, because unsupported by any
other employee, the Board stated in dictum that it would have been protected none-
theless had its purpose been to protest an employer unfair labor practice.
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in the public interest by invoking the administrative procedures of
the Act-a theory which suggests that the same individual should be
protected against discipline for making known his complaint about
working conditions to a different governmental agency or, in an
effort to exhaust private channels first, directly to the employer.
One person will be protected if he enlists the support of only
one other worker or if he seeks to improve working conditions by
circulating a petition looking toward group protest, even if as yet
he has been given little or no support by fellow employees. 223 One
person will be protected if he files a grievance in the manner ex-
pressly contemplated by the collective bargaining agreement.
224
One person will be protected if, even though his own working con-
ditions may not be directly affected, he verbalizes support for an
impending strike by other company employees at another facility.22 5
Indeed, an individual employee is protected when expressing sym-
pathy for the striking employees of an entirely different company,226
or when honoring their picket line there or otherwise demonstrating
in their support (even, apparently, when those other workers are
not even covered by the NLRA).227 Many of these precedents have
been given the implied endorsement of the United States Supreme
Court..
22 8
Unless group action is to be exalted merely for its own sake,
without regard for the statutory purpose-the protection of indi-
vidual workers in attempting to improve their own working condi-
tions-it is difficult to see why individual endorsement of group
protests among other workers should be treated with greater favor
under the NLRA than individual protests directed at one's own
wages and working conditions. Granting protection to such pro-
tests will by no means rend the fabric of the Act; it will produce a
broader and more coherent and rational interpretive pattern.
It also will result in the elimination of a number of unjust
artificialities in the application of the law, some of them in the
NLRB decisions and some of them in the court decisions. For ex-
22 NLRB v. Empire Gas, Inc., 566 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1977); Savin Business
Mach. Corp., 243 N.L.R.B. 92, 94 (1979) (concerted activity requires "only a
speaker and a listener").
224 NLRB v. Selwyn Shoe Mfg. Corp., 428 F.2d 217 (8th Cir. 1970).
225 Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1968).
226 NLBB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Choc. Co., 130 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1942).
227 Washington State Serv. Employees, 188 N.L.R.B. 957 (1971); R. Gopa-&,
LABnO LAw 322-25 (1976).
228Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 564 n.13 (1978).
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ample, as noted above, among the situations in which the Board
will be quick to find "constructive concerted activity," with some
judicial approval, is when the individual's protest finds its source
in an existing collective bargaining agreement. But the Board
makes no pretense that the individual's complaint must be inten-
tionally and expressly anchored in the labor contract; it will be
deemed concerted activity whether or not the individual mentions
the contract, whether or not the contract actually supports the claim,
and indeed whether or not the individual is even aware that a con-
tract exists. 229 On a rare occasion, injustice will be done when an
administrative law judge or the Board itself, for no apparent reason,
overlooks the fiction and denies protection because the complaining
employee did not in fact advert to the contract or because his or her
claim cannot be sustained under the contract's terms. These
anomalies would be eliminated if the fiction of "constructive con-
certed activity" were discarded in favor of direct protection for in-
dividual claims relating to wages and working conditions. It is
unjustifiably harsh to penalize the employee who, on account of
insecurity or inadvertence, neglects to mention the labor contract,
while protecting a fellow employee who, out of argumentativeness
or chance advice from another, does mention it. This distinction
is not responsive to the concerns of the NLRA.
The same can be said with respect to the court decisions which
are prepared to protect the individual employee against discipline
if he enlists a friend to come with him to the employer, or if he
(with or without endorsement by his co-workers) relates a complaint
in the first-person plural rather than the first-person singular. It
trivializes the significant public policy underlying statutory protec-
tion to make it turn upon such fortuitous circumstances.
230
It remains to discuss perhaps the most objectionable principle
that has been derived from the cases requiring, as a condition of
229 See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
23 0 The same criticism is justified when decisions make statutory protection for
the individual turn upon mention of a union. In Randolph Div., Ethan Allen, Inc.
v. NLRB, 513 F.2d 706 (1st Cir. 1975), an employee was discharged one week
after she asked the company for financial information, stating that "she was con-
cerned about the fact that there was no union at the plant." Id. 707. Even though
there was no union organization drive afoot, and even though the employee went
alone to management and had not discussed the matter with other employees, her
reference to unionization was apparently regarded as sufficient to protect her
against discipline. The court stated that: "[i]f [the company] could so extinguish
seeds, it would have no need to uproot sprouts." Id. 708. It appears that had the
employee not accomplished her request for financial information with the reference
to a nonexistent union, the court would have sustained her discharge. It makes little
sense to condition the application of § 7 rights upon such an inconsequential
consideration.
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section 7 protection, that the individual employee have actually
acted in concert with others-that is, the principle that even in such
group-action cases, protection against discipline will be lost unless
it is proved that the employer had actual knowledge that the indi-
vidual was acting with others.
The problem is illustrated by Air Surrey Corp. v. NLRB,
231
in which four employees drove to their employer's bank, which had
previously dishonored their paychecks for insufficient funds, to in-
quire whether the employer had enough money in its account to
meet the next payroll. Because of an inability to find a parking
space, only one of the employees, Patton, left the car to enter the
bank. When his inquisitiveness was brought to the attention of
company management, he was discharged. The Board found Pat-
ton's inquiry at the bank to be protected activity; it disclaimed
reliance on the fact that he was acting in league with three others
and instead found constructive concerted activity because such
inquiries "relate to conditions of employment that are matters of
mutual concern to all the affected employees. '232 There was thus
no need to consider whether the employer knew that there was
group action, because under the Board's theory even an individual's
action was protected through the fiction of constructive concerted
activity.
The court of appeals firmly disagreed, however, and denied
enforcement. The court relied, as have other courts in similar
cases, upon the unexceptionable principle that to make out a vio-
lation of the Act it must be shown that the employer was aware that
the employee was engaging in protected activity and that the
employer discharged the employee for that reason. Because there
was no substantial evidence that the employer knew that Patton
was acting along with and on behalf of his three co-workers, the
court reversed the Board's finding of a section 8(a)(1) violation.233
Although this approach is found in appellate decisions at least as
far back as 1949,234 it is unwarranted for at least two reasons.
231 601 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1979), denying enforcement to 229 N.L.R.B. 1064
(1977).
232 229 N.L.R.B. at 1064.
233Because the court concluded that the Board had erred in using the
fiction of constructive concerted activity, and that actual concert and actual em-
ployer knowledge were elements of the unfair labor practice, the more appropriate
disposition of the case would have been a remand to the Board to develop a record
on these issues. See Jim Causley Pontiac v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1980).234 See NLRB v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 179 F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1949).
In NLRB v. Office Towel Supply Co., 201 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1953), an employee
was discharged when she was reported to have said: "This is a hell of a place to
work. They expect one girl to do the work of five .... ." Id. 839. Although this
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The first reason, although the less important of the two, is that
the requirement of actual employer knowledge is inconsistently
applied in the cases: it frequently rests upon fictional presumptions,
and frequently appears to reflect little more than the factfinder's
unarticulated sympathy either for the employer or for the dis-
ciplined individual. For example, it is not unusual for the Board
to find employer knowledge of concerted activity stemming from
little more than a vague company awareness of inchoate employee
dissatisfaction,235 or awareness that a similar complaint has been
made at some time in the past by some other employee. 236 The
courts are generally less hospitable. In Indiana Gear Works v.
NLRB,2 3 for example, the court was willing to assume that an
employee who had posted cartoons ridiculing the company's recent
two-cent wage increase had been aided by two other employees in
suggesting captions and in posting, and that other employees were
dissatisfied with the wage increase; nonetheless, the court found
there was no employer knowledge that other employees had par-
ticipated in the cartoon campaign or even that employees other
than the dischargee were dissatisfied with the two-cent increase.
More recently, in Tri-State Truck Service, Inc. v. NLRB,2 38
employees McDonald and Kovach were both discharged after each
had refused to deliver fuel oil on a Saturday after a heavy snowfall
unless they were paid premium pay; McDonald had so announced
over the telephone, and the same position was taken soon after by
Kovach, who was known by the employer to live in the same house
as McDonald and who had stated over the telephone that he was
"sticking with" McDonald. The court intimated that this refusal
was said in the midst of a discussion with other employees, who were voicing their
dissatisfaction and their belief in the need for a union, that fact was not known to
the employer and for this reason a divided court of appeals refused to adopt the
Board's finding of a section 8(a)(1) violation. An alternative ground for decision
was that the employee's conduct was not section 7 activity, but rather "mere
griping" in front of other employees. Judge Clark dissented, arguing that the
employer should not be able to assert the defense of ignorance, lest enforcement of
the NLRA be crippled in cases of incipient unionization stemming from employee
complaints. Id. 841.235 E.g., St. Joseph's High School, 236 N.L.R.B. 1623, 1623 n.1 (1978) (Board
holds protected an individual's writing of a letter to an accreditation association,
complaining of salaries and working conditions, and finds that "[rlespondent at all
times was fully aware of the continuing unsatisfied concerns expressed by members
of the lay faculty"), vacated on other grounds, 248 N.L.R.B. 901 (1980); Carbet
Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. 892 (1971), enforced, 68 Lab. Cas. (CCH) f 12,045 (6th Cir.
1972).
236 Pink Moody, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 39 (1978).
237371 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1967). The court made much of the dischargee's
habitual sarcasm and earlier reprimand for sarcasm and poor attitude.
23s 616 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1980).
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to work was not concerted, and held that in any event these facts
did not provide record evidence substantial enough to warrant an
inference by the administrative law judge and the Board that the
employer had actual knowledge of concert between McDonald and
Kovach prior to their discharge. The result is particularly startling
because the court's statement of the prevailing law contemplated
that a violation could be made out even without actual knowledge
that employees are engaging in concerted activity; in its general
statement, the court treated it as sufficient that the employer "had
reason to know" of such concert.
Even though other courts have been somewhat more sympa-
thetic, the fact remains that the "employer knowledge" standard
has been erratically and tendentiously applied, and that it thus
breeds uncertainty and unfairness in litigation.23 9
The second and more fundamental weakness in the "employer
knowledge" test is that it rests on an erroneous interpretation of
the NLRA and frustrates the objectives of the statute. If an em-
ployer discharges an employee not for protected activity but for
"'cause" resulting from delinquencies on the job, the Act is not
violated, and the employer's ignorance that the employee was in
fact engaged in activity which the Act protects will conclusively
negate an illicit motive. Surely, for example, if an employee is
discharged for repeated and insubordinate meddling in the affairs
of others beyond her job responsibilities, and not for writing an
anonymous letter to the employer complaining about its proposed
wage adjustments, there should be no violation.240
239 A rather striking example is Walls Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 753 (D.C.
Cir. 1963), which was twice before the Board and twice before the court of
appeals. In that case, the company discharged an employee for writing a signed
letter to the state health department complaining about unsanitary restroom condi-
tions. 'Although the Board found that the letter was concerted activity because
two other employees approved it before mailing, it held, applying prevailing appel-
late law, that, because the employer was unaware of this fact at the time it dis-
charged the letter-writer, there was no violation of the NLRA. 128 N.L.R.B. 487
(1960), remanded, 299 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The court of appeals reversed,
however, stating that the "employer knowledge" requirement need not be applied
"in full strictness and severity," in view of the fact that the company knew this
employee had previously sought to unionize, it suspected that she had been re-
sponsible for an earlier complaining letter which did refer to other employees, and
the dischargee immediately after her firing told the employer she had written the
second letter on behealf of her co-workers as well. 299 F.2d at 116. On remand,
the Board found that the employer had knowledge that the second letter was a
group effort, and held that the discharge therefore was an unfair labor practice.
The court of appeals enforced. 137 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1962), enforced, 321 F.2d 753
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 923 (1963).
24O Diagnostic Center Hosp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1977).
The same principle explains why the employer was found not to have com-
mitted an unfair labor practice for discharging an employee who sat out of place in
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If, however, the employer has imposed discipline not for some
independent job-related "cause" but rather for a worker's protest
or inquiry regarding wages or working conditions, that should be
sufficient to find a violation, even without proof that the employer
knew that a second employee was implicated. What public policy
demands that the employer in the Air Surrey case be permitted in
effect to insulate itself against statutory liability merely by neglect-
ing to ask whether the inquisitive employee who stopped at the
bank was in the company of other employees? Why should statu-
tory protection in that case depend upon whether parking or
weather conditions at the bank were such that all but one of the
employees remained in the car, rather than all but two?
Although the Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Burnup &
Sims 241 does not squarely control the issue, its reasoning argues
powerfully that actual employer knowledge of employee concert
ought not be a condition of liability. In that case, the employer
discharged two employees known to be soliciting for the union;
the employer had been informed by another employee that these
organizers had threatened to dynamite the union's way into the
plant if that were necessary. In fact, the union supporters had
made no such threat. Even though the employer believed in good
faith that they had, and thus that their organizing activities were
not protected, the employer was wrong, and the Court found the
discharges to be unlawful and ordered not only reinstatement but
back pay. The discharge of innocent employees actually engaged
in protected activity was found unlawful even though the facts on
which the employer reasonably based its discipline would have
clearly suggested otherwise.
The same is true in the cases involving activities by individual
employees. What the Supreme Court regarded as central in
Burnup was less the employer's state of mind than the impact upon
employees engaging in protected activity and upon other employees
who might be inclined to do so in the future: "[T]he protected
activity would lose some of its immunity, since the example of em-
ployees who are discharged on false charges would or might have
a deterrent effect on other employees." 242 Similarly, there seems
a sex-segregated dining hall when it was unknown to the employer that the purpose
of doing so was to protest such segregation. New England Fish Co., 212 N.L.R.B.
306 (1974) (when ordered to move by a supervisor, the employee precipitated a
fight; the Board found this to be an independent and fair ground for discharge).
241379 U.S. 21 (1964).
242 d. 23.
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to be no question that the discharge of a single individual because
he has protested about wages or working conditions will coercively
restrain similar protest-whether by other individuals or by groups
-of workers-in the future. To treat such a discharge as a violation
of section 8(a)(1) is wholly consistent with the long-established
doctrine (exemplified by Burnup & Sims itself) that the key to a
violation of that section is not the employer's illicit motive but
-rather the coercive effect upon the exercise of section 7 rights.23
Cases announcing the doctrine of "constructive concerted ac-
tivity" make unnecessary the search for actual employer knowledge
of concert. Even more readily can that search be discarded when
the statute is construed not to require concert at all, constructive
or otherwise. As a result, a significant burden of uncertainty im-
posed upon employers and employees by the current state of statu-
tory construction is removed.
Under a legislative scheme in which protest by two individuals
is protected but protest by one is not, it could be argued that it is
unfair to the employer to impose liability unless the fact of concert
is known. Otherwise, the employer will not know whether the law
permits disciplinary action against an individual in a particular
situation. If concerted activity were discovered only after discharge,
statutory liability might thus unfairly be imposed by surprise. But
if the individual who protests wages or working conditions is pro-
tected regardless of formal participation by others, the employer
will know what the demands of the law are: once the employer knows
the nature of the individual's protest and disciplines him or her
therefor, it can expect to have such discipline overturned.
This would not undermine any significant employer interest-
and that is the final reason why the interpretation of section 7 pro-
posed here is not only more consistent with the statutory objective
of justice for the individual worker but is also practicable and fair
to the employer.
Employers might be inclined to believe that the proposed inter-
pretation will significantly undermine plant discipline and produc-
tivity. Should not an employee lose the protection of the Act
when he complains chronically and unreasonably? Will not the
proposed interpretation coddle the incurably insubordinate? Will
it not be an invitation to individual refusals to work which will
interfere with production and which will, in unionized plants,
undermine the status of the union and the integrity of the grievance
procedures of the contract (which typically require the disen-
243 R. Gonm", supra note 227, at 132-34.
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chanted employee to follow the employer's directives while utilizing
the contractual grievance machinery)?
The same inquiries can be raised when the complaints or work
stoppages are by two employees rather than one, and all that is pro-
posed here is that the protection of the statute be accorded in the
same manner to the one as it is to the two. It has long been the
law, for example, that even group action will lose its protection if
it is pursued in a manner which is disloyal, insubordinate, abusive,
malicious, profane, or intended to harass. The same would be true
of complaints and protests undertaken by an individual employee.2
So, too, just as it is unprotected for a union organizer to solicit or
otherwise divert the attention of a fellow employee during working
time,245 the same would be true of importunings by an individual
worker.246 And even if an individual employee's complaint is
deemed to be protected, the employer is free to take responsive
action which is designed to promote its legitimate business interests,
just as the employer is privileged to react in group-action cases.
247
Perhaps the two most troubling categories of cases for manage-
ment, apart from the so-called "chronic complainer," are those in
which the complaint of the individual employee is manifested in a
refusal to perform work and those in which the employee chooses to
avoid an available grievance procedure under a collective bargain-
ing agreement.
When an individual's refusal to work is rooted in a belief that
it is unsafe or dangerous to perform assigned duties, there is little
reason to make statutory protection contingent upon being joined
by another. The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Washington Alumi-
num Co.2 48 held that a spontaneous concerted walk-out on account
244 Bichboro Community Mental Health Council, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 1267,
1267-68 (1979) (writing letter to third persons protesting the discharge of a fellow
employee was protected activity; protection can be lost, however, when "the at-
titude of the employees is flagrantly disloyal, wholly incommensurate with any
grievance which they may have, and manifested by public disparagement of the
employer's product or undermining of its reputation") (quoting Veeder-Root Co.,
237 N.L.R.B. 1175 (1978)); Hawthorne Mazda, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 313, 316
(1980) (critical comments to the company's vice-president and general-manager
were not "indefensible or so out of context as to render him unfit for further
service") (footnote omitted), enforced, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2344 (9th Cir. 1981).
245 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); R. Cowu' u, supra
note 48, at 179-84.
2
4
6 Cf. Colonial Stores, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1980) (employee discharged
for circulating petition accusing company of failing to implement terms of bargaining
agreement).
247 R. Gomm.AN, supra note 227, at 341-53.
248 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
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of extremely cold conditions in a non-union plant is protected, and
the case of the individual employee who refuses to work because of
excessive lint or dust or paint fumes in the air, or because the lights,
brakes or tires on his truck are defective, would appear to have at
least a comparable claim to statutory protection. This is true
whether or not there is a collective bargaining agreement upon
which the individual may rest his refusal to work. 249 If the indi-
vidual employee has a good faith belief of danger, or at least a rea-
sonably based one,2 0 there is no significant employer interest that
dictates the treatment of such a work stoppage as unprotected.
When, however, the refusal to work on the part of the indi-
vidual employee is not because of unsafe conditions but is merely
a form of protest, the employee's case is arguably less sympathetic.
For example, in NLRB v. Dawson Cabinet Co., 12 the Board over-
turned the discharge of a female employee who refused to perform
work until she was assured that she would be paid as much for that
work as would a male employee; but the court found no protected
concerted activity, because no other employee had refused to work
or had even shared her concern for equal pay. Had the employee
in fact been urged or delegated by other employees to protest about
this issue and to refuse the work assignment, Washington Aluminum
would rather clearly point toward her statutory protection. It must
be remembered, however, that that would not deprive the employer
of the privilege to take responsive action consistent with the needs
of the business, for example, by assigning her to some vacant lower
job classification pending her willingness to accept the assignment.
The same reasonable responsive action would be available to the
employer had the individual's protest been deemed protected in
spite of the lack of support from fellow workers. But discharge
would not be available in the single-employee case, as it would not
be in the group-action case.
When a collective bargaining agreement is in effect, it should
be construed to render single-employee protest unprotected in those
circumstances where group protest would also be unprotected. Most
obviously, a no-strike provision in a labor contract, which is com-
249 E.g., Bay-Wood Indus., 249 N.L.R.B. 403 (1980) (existing labor contract),
enforcement denied, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3175 (6th Cir. 1981); Pink Moody, Inc.,
237 N.L.R.B. 39 (1978) (non-union company). It must be emphasized that this
view has been rejected by some courts of appeals. E.g., NLRB v. C & I Air Con-
ditioning, Inc., 486 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1973) (individual's refusal to carry heavy
air conditioning equipment onto temporary stairway believed to be unsafe).
250 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
251 66 F.2d 1079 (1977).
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monly understood to render unprotected a concerted stoppage dur-
ing the contract term, should have the same impact on a "protest
stoppage" by an individual. 2 And even apart from an express
no-strike clause, the simple fact that there is a majority recognized
union which is administering a labor agreement will in most in-
stances render unprotected an individual's stoppages or picketing,
just as with comparable group action under the decision of
the Supreme Court in Emporium Capwel Co. v. Western Addi-
tion Community Organization.5-'  The Emporium decision would
suggest that adamant insistence on the part of an individual em-
ployee that the employer engage in bargaining with him with a
view toward changing working conditions should also be treated as
unprotected.2
But it does not follow that the individual in an organized
collective bargaining unit loses the protection of the Act for nothing
more than a verbal complaint, protest, or insistence upon resolving
his grievance consistently with the contract but without the active
cooperation of the union. Some decisions have suggested that the
assertion of a grievance outside of the formal grievance procedure
should render the individual susceptible to discharge or other
discipline.255 But the reasoning used to support this position-that
through the recognition, no-strike, and grievance procedures of the
contract, the individual makes an implied commitment to deal on
grievances only through the union and only in the precise manner
set forth in the contract-is totally unconvincing. The right to
make individual grievances known to management is expressly
granted by section 9(a) of the NLRA, and that section also clearly
suggests that the union may not bargain away that right.256
252 Sunbeam Corp., 184 N.L.R.B. 950 (1970) (Board concluded that the labor
agreement's no-strike clause was violated by an individual employee who, in protest-
ing the denial of a requested transfer, distributed to employees and to the public a
petition which the Board majority construed to invite picketing and boycott of the
company), aff'd in relevant part, 459 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1972).
253 420 U.S. 50 (1975). The Board recently has stated that, even where there
is a bargaining agreement with grievance procedures and a no-strike clause, an
individual engaging in informational picketing and leafleting will not automatically
lose the protection of section 7. Colonial Stores Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1980).
254 Norfolk Conveyor, 159 N.L.R.B. 464 (1966). In that case, the Board de-
cided against the employee, rejecting the theory of constructive concerted activity
and relying on the Mushroom Transportation case. This case would have been
better decided on a theory akin to that in Emporium (which, of course, had not yet
been decided).
25 E.g., Sunbeam Corp., 184 N.L.R.B. 950 (1970), aff'd in relevant part, 459
F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1972); R.J. Tower Iron Works, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 445 (1963).
256 Section 9(a) grants not only "the right at any time to present grievances"
to an employer, but also the right "to have such grievances adjusted, without the
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It is true that section 9(a) has been construed by the Supreme
Court in Emporium Capwel not to accord an indefeasible right to
an individual to secure the employer's ear; the purpose was rather
"to authorize the employer to entertain [grievances] without open-
ing itself to liability for dealing directly with employees in deroga-
tion of the duty to bargain only with the exclusive representa-
tive." 25 Although the employer may thus refuse to entertain an
employee's presentation, nothing in the Act suggests it should be
permitted to discharge an employee for attempting to make that
presentation. Such a construction would be wholly inconsistent
with the language and policy of section 9(a). In a number of re-
cent cases, the NLRB has in fact concluded that the failure of an
individual to file a formal grievance under a labor contract does
not render his complaint unprotected,2sS and that although it is
section 9(a) which expressly deals with the individual's right to
present grievances independently of the union, it is section 7 which
accords that right and nothing in section 9(a) is intended to limit
it. 29
Finally, it could be claimed that the interpretation of section 7
proposed in this Article will unwisely inject the Board into too
many discipline cases that would better be resolved through con-
tractual grievance and arbitration procedures. It is true that the
proposed interpretation results in making the Board an available
forum for challenging discipline of the "uncooperative" employee
who complains about his wages or working conditions. (Again, this
has always been true when there are two "complainers" who act
together.) It is also true that arbitrators frequently deal with dis-
ciplinary grievances centering around the insubordinate or quarrel-
some employee, and that arbitral disposition will likely be faster
than Board disposition, if not perhaps as substantively sophisticated
and procedurally fair.
It is therefore arguable that the Board should defer a hearing
on a section 8(a)(1) charge until available grievance and arbitration
procedures have been exhausted, under the doctrine of Collyer In-
intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not in-
consistent with the terms of" any existing labor contract. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1976).
257 420 U.S. at 61 n.12.
2 5 8 Bay-Wood Indus., 249 N.L.R.B. 403 (1980), enforcement denied, 108
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3175 (6th Cir. 1981) (Board recalled its firmly held rule that
the complaining employee retains the protection of the Act, under the theory of
constructive concerted activity, even if he or she never adverts to the labor contract
at all).
259 Colonial Stores, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1980).
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sulated Wire.20° The Board has wavered, however, on the question
whether it should defer to arbitration procedures in section 8(a)(1)
cases, and at the moment it does not do so, by virtue of its split
decision in General American Transportation.28 ' Without com-
menting on the general question of deferral in section 8(a)(1) cases,
it should be noted that in many of these cases, the disciplined indi-
vidual had voiced a complaint through channels other than the
union, or without the cooperation or endorsement of fellow em-
ployees. It is therefore perhaps reasonable for the Board, in this
particular category of cases, to be wary of the extent to which the
union will devote its energy and its resources to pressing the chal-
lenge to the employer's action through an arbitration proceeding.
When there has already been a resolution of the discipline
grievance before an impartial arbitrator after a fair hearing, the
Board would be advised to defer to the arbitrator's determination
under the Spielberg Manufacturing Co.2 62 standards, provided the
outcome is not repugnant to the policies of the NLRA and provided
the arbitrator has considered whether the discharge was in fact
for "complaining" (as distinguished from some completely different
business-related motive put forward by the employer) and whether
the "complaining" had become sufficiently abusive, insubordinate,
or harassing as to constitute cause for discipline under traditional
industrial standards.
26 3
Because the Board may be more inclined to believe itself sensi-
tive to statutory values in such cases, it may be less willing than arbi-
trators to find that persistent complaining constitutes cause for
discipline.2 4 If this is an "interference" with contractual dispute-
resolution procedures which is unwanted by both unions and man-
260 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
261 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977).
262 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). See R. GoBmAN, supra note 227, at 734-46.
263 Compare NLRB v. General Warehouse Corp., 643 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1981)
with Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (1980).
264 Colonial Stores Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1980), is just such a case. There,
an employee was discharged for circulating a petition among other employees pro-
testing the company's alleged failure to abide by the labor contract -and for par-
ticipating in a parking-lot demonstration (along with her nonemployee husband)
protesting the company's alleged failure to abide by an earlier grievance settlement
with her. The union took the discharge grievance to arbitration, and the arbitrator
upheld the employer, concluding that the employee had improperly engaged in
self-help measures inconsistent with the contractual grievance procedures. In a
2 to 1 decision, the Board refused to enforce the arbitrator's decision, finding that
the employee's conduct was concerted and protected by section 7, and that the
arbitrator's decision was therefore repugnant to the NLRA.
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agement, it is not qualitatively different from the ordinary run of
deferral cases arising under sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), and 8(b)(2).2 5
In sum, the construction of the NLRA offered here works little
or no qualitative legal change for either the Board or employers;
but it does eliminate harshness, artificiality, and uncertainty while
attending more faithfully to the history, values, and goals embraced
in the Labor Act.
26 5 See supra notes 261-62.
